Statutory Interpretation Lessons Courtesy of \u3cem\u3ePilgrim’s Pride\u3c/em\u3e by Cohen, Philip G.
University of Miami Law School
University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository
University of Miami Business Law Review
5-1-2017
Statutory Interpretation Lessons Courtesy of
Pilgrim’s Pride
Philip G. Cohen
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umblr
Part of the Securities Law Commons, Taxation-Federal Commons, and the Tax Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion
in University of Miami Business Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more
information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation





Statutory Interpretation Lessons Courtesy of 
Pilgrim’s Pride 
Philip G. Cohen* 
In Pilgrim’s Pride Corp. v. Commissioner, the Fifth Circuit 
reversed the Tax Court and held that the taxpayer was entitled to 
an ordinary loss deduction from its abandonment of securities. 
While the conclusion reached by the Fifth Circuit has been 
overshadowed by the promulgation of Treasury Regulation 
section 1.165-5(i) that effectively treats an abandoned security as 
worthless and thus characterizes the loss as capital, the case 
remains noteworthy because it provides an opportunity to 
examine the statutory interpretation of two distinct Internal 
Revenue Code sections, section 165(g)(1) and section 1234A. The 
article focuses on what methods of statutory construction should 
have been utilized to determine the application of these sections 
to the Pilgrim’s Pride fact-pattern. 
Ordinary loss treatment for an abandoned security seems 
conceptually incorrect when both a worthless security and a sale 
of the security for a de minimis amount would generally result in 
a capital loss. The article analyzes whether, and if so, under what 
theory did the courts deciding Pilgrim’s Pride possess the 
statutory authority to treat the abandonment as a capital loss. 
Furthermore, assuming the courts had such authority, the article 
considers whether it was proper to do so under the particular 
factual circumstances surrounding this case. 
                                                                                                             
 *  Associate Professor of Taxation, Pace University Lubin School of Business; Retired 
Vice President-Tax & General Tax Counsel, Unilever United States, Inc.; New York 
University, B.A., 1971; Duke University School of Law, J.D., 1974; New York University 
School of Law, LL.M.(Labor Law), 1975; LL.M. (Taxation), 1982; George Washington 
University, M.B.A., 1979. The author would like to thank Michael Schler and Professor 
Richard Kraus for their helpful comments on an earlier draft and his graduate teaching 
assistant, Huirong (Helena) Tang for her assistance with the article. All errors or omissions 
are his own. 
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There are a variety of statutory construction methodologies each 
with erudite proponents making very persuasive contentions. 
Applying an Internal Revenue Code section to a particular fact-
pattern, however, it can often be wiser not to be wedded to one 
approach, e.g., textualism. Instead, it is submitted that employing 
disparate methodologies depending on the particular 
circumstances may be sounder. Pilgrim’s Pride provides a focal 
point for examining statutory interpretation methodologies and 
illustrating the foregoing. As such, reflecting on the case has 
continuing relevance despite the widespread application of 
Treasury Regulation section 1.165-5(i) to the abandonment of 
securities. 
As demonstrated by the different approaches that I believe were 
proper here for considering the applicability of sections 165(g)(1) 
and 1234A to Pilgrim’s Pride, distinct circumstances require 
discrete approaches to applying a statutory provision to a case. 
Our democratic institutions are not put at risk, by foregoing 
dogmatic textualism where this would lead to a result wherein “no 
conceivable tax policy . . . supports this interpretation” or 
deeming, in the case of section 165(g)(1), an abandoned security 
to be per se worthless. Restraint, however, from deviating from 
the clear language of the text, such as applying section 1234A to 
inherent rights, may be in order where there are no overriding 
reasons not to do so. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In Pilgrim’s Pride Corp. v. Commissioner,1 the Fifth Circuit reversed 
the Tax Court and held that the taxpayer was entitled to an ordinary loss 
deduction from its abandonment of securities. While the conclusion 
reached by the Fifth Circuit has been overshadowed by the promulgation 
of Regulation section 1.165-5(i)2 that effectively treats an abandoned 
security as worthless and thus characterizes the loss as capital, reflecting 
on the case remains noteworthy because it provides an opportunity to 
examine the statutory interpretation of two distinct Internal Revenue Code 
sections, section 165(g)(1) and section 1234A. The article focuses on what 
methods of statutory construction should have been utilized to determine 
the application of these sections to the Pilgrim’s Pride fact-pattern. 
Ordinary loss treatment for an abandoned security seems conceptually 
incorrect when both a worthless security and a sale of the security for a de 
minimis amount would generally result in a capital loss. The article 
analyzes whether, and if so under what theory did the courts deciding 
Pilgrim’s Pride possess the statutory authority to treat the abandonment as 
a capital loss. Furthermore, assuming the courts had such authority, the 
article considers whether it was proper to do so under the particular factual 
circumstances surrounding this case. 
With respect to section 165(g)(1), the issue, which was eschewed by 
the Tax Court, was whether a court should consider an abandoned security 
having objective value as being worthless. There was an absence of any 
evidence that Congress contemplated such treatment and the regulation 
mandating such an outcome was not effective for the year in question. 
Furthermore, there was a revenue ruling and court decisions that could be 
interpreted, at least by analogy as precedent for an ordinary loss. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, per se capital loss characterization for an 
abandoned security, absent taxpayer reliance on guidance from the 
Service, is both logical and consistent with sound public policy. 
Section 1234A is a provision described by one author as 
“cumbersome”3 and whose existence might not survive tax reform of 
derivative instruments.4 For both section 165(g)(1) and section 1234A, the 
                                                                                                             
1 Pilgrim’s Pride Corp. v. Comm’r, 779 F. 3d 311 (5th Cir. 2015), rev’g 141 T.C. 533  
(2013). 
2 See Abandonment of Stocks or Other Securities, 73 Fed. Reg. 13,124 (Mar. 12, 2008) 
(to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
3 See David J. Roberts, Law Treating Certain Terminations as Sales Needs 
Clarification, 150 TAX NOTES 337 (2016). 
4 The Modernization of Derivatives Tax Act of 2016, S. __, introduced in May 2016 by 
Senate Finance Committee ranking minority member Ron Wyden (D-OR) would, if 
enacted, repeal section 1234A. It would have also been repealed under the legislation 
proposed a few years ago by then House Ways and Means Committee Chair Dave Camp 
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article seeks to examine what were the appropriate methodologies for 
construing the respective provisions in connection with the abandonment 
of a security. 
By way of background, generally, the sale or exchange of a capital 
asset for a loss is treated as a capital loss.5 Capital losses are only allowed 
to a corporate taxpayer to the extent of capital gains,6 although such capital 
losses can be carried back three taxable years and forward for five taxable 
years if there is insufficient capital gain in the year of the capital loss.7 
Section 165 (a) sets forth a general rule permitting a deduction for 
losses “not compensated for or by insurance or otherwise.”8 Treasury 
Regulation section 1.165-2(a) specifies in pertinent part that 
A loss incurred in a business or in a transaction entered 
into for profit and arising from the sudden termination of 
the usefulness in such business or transaction of any non-
depreciable property, in a case where such business or 
transaction is discontinued or where such property is 
permanently discarded from use therein, shall be allowed 
as a deduction under section 165(a) for the taxable year in 
which the loss is actually sustained.9 
Pursuant to Treasury Regulation section 1.165-2(b), however, 
Treasury regulation section 1.165-2(a) is not applicable “to losses 
sustained upon the sale or exchange of property.”10 
Treasury regulation section 1.165-1(b) provides in pertinent part that 
To be allowable as a deduction under section 165(a), a 
loss must be evidenced by closed and completed 
transactions, fixed by identifiable events, and, except as 
otherwise provided in section 165(h) and § 1.165-11, 
relating to disaster losses, actually sustained during the 
taxable year.11 
                                                                                                             
(R.-MI). See JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, Technical Explanation, Estimated Revenue 
Effects, Distributional Analysis, and Macroeconomic Analysis of the Tax Reform Act of 
2014, A Discussion Draft of the Chairman of the House Committee on Ways and Means to 
Reform the Internal Revenue Code, JCS-1-14, at 281-293 (2014). 
5 See I.R.C. § 1222 (2014). 
6 See I.R.C. § 1211(a) (2012). 
7 See I.R.C. § 1212(a) (2012). 
8 I.R.C. § 165(a) (2012). 
9 Treas. Reg. § 1.165-2(a) (2014). 
10 Treas. Reg. § 1.165-2(b) (2014). 
11 Treas. Reg. § 1.165-1(b) (2014). 
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The requirement for a “closed and completed” transaction is met, as 
the Service observed in Revenue Ruling 2004-58, when the “taxpayer . . . 
show[s] both (1) an intention to abandon the asset, and (2) an affirmative 
act of abandonment.”12 The Service conceded that the taxpayer in 
Pilgrim’s Pride satisfied these requirements.13 
The amount of the loss should equal to the taxpayer’s basis in the 
security.14 Thus, ignoring the character of the loss, the taxpayer should 
have realized a $98.6 million loss in the abandoned securities equal to its 
basis. 
Section 165(g)(1) provides as a general rule for capital loss treatment 
in the case of a worthless security stating that “(i)f any security which is a 
capital asset becomes worthless during the taxable year, the loss resulting 
therefrom shall, for purposes of this subtitle, be treated as a loss from the 
sale or exchange, on the last day of the taxable year, of a capital asset.”15 
A security is defined for this purpose to mean 
(A) a share of stock in a corporation; (B) a right to 
subscribe for, or to receive, a share of stock in a 
corporation; or (C) a bond, debenture, note, or certificate, 
or other evidence of indebtedness, issued by a corporation 
or by a government or political subdivision thereof, with 
interest coupons or in registered form.16 
In 2008, the Treasury Department promulgated Regulation section 
1.165-5(i), which provides that an abandoned security is deemed worthless 
                                                                                                             
12 Rev. Rul. 2004-58, 2004-1 C.B. 1043 (2004). 
13 Opening Brief for Respondent at 16, Pilgrim’s Pride Corp. v. Comm’r, 141 T.C. 533 
(2013). 
14 Section 165(b) provides that “[f]or purposes of subsection (a), the basis for 
determining the amount of the deduction for any loss shall be the adjusted basis provided 
in section 1011 for determining the loss from the sale or other disposition of property.” 
I.R.C. § 165 (2014). 
15 IRC § 165(g)(1) (2014). Thus, by deeming “a sale or exchange” to occur a necessary 
element for capital loss treatment under § 1222(10), is met. While not germane to Pilgrim’s 
Pride, as noted, section 165(g)(1) only applies if the security is a capital asset. For example, 
it would be inapposite if the taxpayer were a dealer and held the security in its inventory. 
See I.R.C. § 1221(a)(1). Treas. Reg. § 1.165-5(b) provides that “[i]f any security which is 
not a capital asset becomes wholly worthless during the taxable year, the loss resulting 
therefrom may be deducted under section 165(a) as an ordinary loss.” A major exception 
to the general rule of § 165(g)(1), is contained in § 165(g)(3) addressing securities in 
affiliated corporations. If the requirements of that section are met, the loss is an ordinary 
loss because the security is deemed not to be a capital asset. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-5(b) 
(2014). 
16 See I.R.C. § 165(g)(2) (2014). 
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and thus generally comes within the capital loss rule of section 165(g)(1).17 
The regulation is legally inapplicable to Pilgrim’s Pride because it is 
effective only to abandonment of stock or other securities after March 12, 
2008.18 
Ignoring both Treasury Regulation section 1.165-5(i) and the potential 
applications of sections 1234A or 165(g)(1), the latter two of which if 
pertinent would furnish the requisite “sale or exchange” treatment 
necessary for a net capital loss,19 the abandonment of a security would 
generally give rise to an ordinary loss because of the lack of consideration 
received regardless of whether the security is a capital asset. As was 
observed by the Tax Court in La Rue v. Commissioner, “[t]he touchstone 
for sale or exchange treatment is consideration.”20 
If either section 1234A or section 165(g) were determined to be 
applicable to an abandonment of a security, then section 165(f) would 
come into play. Section 165(f) addresses capital losses providing that that 
“[l]osses from sales or exchanges of capital assets shall be allowed only to 
the extent allowed in sections 1211 and 1212.”21 
Section 1234A deems the requisite “sale” treatment for capital gains 
and losses to occur for certain transactions. Specifically, this includes 
generally the “[g]ain or loss attributable to the cancellation, lapse, 
expiration, or other termination of – (1) a right or obligation . . . with 
respect to property which is (or on acquisition would be) a capital asset in 
the hands of the taxpayer . . . .”22 Had the Tax Court’s holding in Pilgrim’s 
Pride been affirmed, i.e., that section 1234A was applicable to an 
abandonment of the securities in question, the taxpayer would be denied 
an ordinary loss, but could avail itself of a capital loss pursuant to section 
                                                                                                             
17 Abandonment of Stocks or Other Securities, 73 Fed. Reg. 13,124 (Mar. 12, 2008). 
The regulation was initially proposed in 2007. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-5(i), 72 Fed. 
Reg. 41468 (July 30, 2007). 
18 Treas. Reg. § 1.165-5(i)(2) (2014). 
19 See I.R.C § 1222(10) (2014). 
20 La Rue v. Comm’r, 90 T.C. 465,483 (1988). While not relevant to the taxpayer’s fact-
pattern, there are instances where an abandonment is a sale or exchange because 
consideration is received. Pursuant to Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2(a), if abandoned property 
results in the taxpayer being relieved of liabilities, taxpayer would generally be treated as 
receiving consideration and thus regarded as a “sale or exchange.” In Yarbro v. Comm’r, 
737 F.2d 479 (5th Cir. 1984), reh. denied, 742 F.2d 1453 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 
1189 (1985), the taxpayers abandoned property for the sole purpose of avoiding further 
property taxes and mortgage payments when the fair market value was exceeded by the 
outstanding debt. The Fifth Circuit held that even when the abandoned property contained 
only non-recourse debt, the loss was properly characterized as a capital loss because “an 
abandonment that is deemed to bring in return relief from a nonrecourse debt is a sale or 
exchange.” Id. at 487. 
21 I.R.C. § 165(f) (2014). 
22 I.R.C. § 1234A (2002). 
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165(f) assuming it had sufficient capital gain to allow the loss to be 
utilized. 23 
In contrast, the Fifth Circuit, concluded that section 1234A (1) was 
inapposite because it determined that the section “only applies to the 
termination of contractual or derivative rights, and not to the abandonment 
of capital assets . . . .”24 The taxpayer’s predecessor had rejected $20 
million offered to redeem certain securities it held, opting instead to 
abandon the securities and it expected obtain a $98.6 million ordinary loss. 
This was worth considerably more than $20 million that had been 
proposed by the issuer. In Tax Court, the taxpayer and the Service initially 
“focused their arguments on whether the abandonment caused the 
securities to become ‘worthless’ making the loss a capital loss . . . .” 25 The 
Tax Court, however, requested briefs on whether section 1234A applied 
and ultimately decided that it did.26 The Fifth Circuit, however, reversed 
the Tax Court and found section 1234A to be inapplicable to an 
abandonment of a security.27 The Court of Appeals also concluded that 
that the Service’s alternative argument that capital loss treatment was 
mandated by section 165(g)(1) to be erroneous.28 
There are a variety of statutory construction methodologies each with 
erudite proponents making very persuasive contentions. Applying an 
Internal Revenue Code section to a particular fact-pattern, however, it can 
often be wiser not to be wedded to one approach, e.g., textualism. Instead, 
it is submitted employing disparate methodologies depending on the 
particular circumstances may be sounder. Pilgrim’s Pride provides a focal 
point for examining statutory interpretation methodologies and illustrating 
the foregoing. As such, reflecting on the case has continuing relevance 
despite the widespread application of Treasury Regulation section 1.165-
5(i) to the abandonment of securities. 
                                                                                                             
23 As noted above, in the absence of sufficient capital gains in the year of the capital 
loss, corporations can carry back net capital losses to three preceding years and carry 
forward such losses for five years. I.R.C. § 1212(a) (2010). 
24 Pilgrim’s Pride v. Comm’r, 779 F.3d 311, 312 (5th Cir. 2015), rev’g 141 T.C. 533 
(2013). 
25 Id. at 313. 
26 Id. 
27 Pilgrim’s Pride Corp. v. Comm’r, 779 F. 3d 311 (5th Cir. 2015), rev’g 141 T.C. 533 
(2013). 
28 Pilgrim’s Pride, 779 F.3d at 317-18. 
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II. PILGRIM’S PRIDE V. COMMISSIONER 
A.  The Tax Court Decision 
The background to the case is as follows. The taxpayer is Pilgrim’s 
Pride Corporation. In 1998, a predecessor of the taxpayer, Gold Kist Inc. 
(“GK Co-op”) sold its agriculture services business to Southern States 
Cooperatives, Inc. (“Southern States”) for $255 million for cash and 
assumption of certain liabilities.29 In order to finance the acquisition, 
Southern States obtained a bridge loan that was secured by a commitment 
letter between Southern States and GK Co-op.30 Pursuant to this 
commitment letter, Southern States had a period of time to raise $100 
million through a public offering.31 Under this arrangement, if Southern 
States failed to undertake the offering within the time provided, Southern 
States could elect to require GK Co-op to purchase certain Southern State 
securities.32 As a result, “on October 5, 1999, GK Co-op purchased 40,000 
shares of Step-Up Rate Series B Cumulative Redeemable Preferred 
Stock . . . of Southern States for $39.2 million and 60,000 shares of Step-
Up Rate Capital Securities, Series A . . . issued by . . . [Southern States 
Capital Trust I, a Delaware statutory trust established by Southern States] 
for $59.4 million.”33 The aggregate total of these securities (collectively 
referred to as “Securities”) was $98.6 million. The Securities met the 
definition of securities in section 165(g)(2).34 
The Securities “generally provided for quarterly dividend payments 
that under certain circumstances could be unilaterally deferred by 
Southern States.”35 Southern States began deferring dividends on the 
Securities in 2002.36 In 2004, Southern States offered to redeem the 
Securities for less than what GK Co-op had paid.37 GK Co-Op’s proposal 
of $31.5 million was rejected by Southern States, which countered $20 
million.38 At that time, i.e., 2004, “GK Co-op was planning to merge with 
and into its wholly owned subsidiary . . . and to take the company 
                                                                                                             
29 Pilgrim’s Pride, 141 T.C. at 537, n. 4. 
30 Pilgrim’s Pride, 779 F.3d at 312. 
31 Opening Brief for Respondent at 4, Pilgrim’s Pride v. Comm’r, 141 T.C. 533 (2013). 
32 Pilgrim’s Pride, 141 T.C. at 537, n.4. 
33 Id. at 535-36 (footnotes omitted). 




38 Pilgrim’s Pride, 141 T.C. at 537. 
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public . . . .”39 It also wanted “to remove [the Securities] . . . from its 
balance sheet before making the public offering.”40 
In May 2004, GK Co-op’s Board of Directors determined that the best 
course of action was to reject Southern State’s $20 million offer and 
instead abandon the Securities.41 The Board did this based on its belief that 
the tax benefit of an ordinary loss of $98.6 million far exceeded the $20 
million offered by Southern States.42 On June 24, 2004 GK Co-op 
irrevocably surrendered the Securities to the issuers for no consideration.43 
It recorded a $38.8 million loss on its financial statements, which was at 
the time the value recorded by GK Co-op on its financial statements 
prepared in accordance with GAAP.44 It claimed an ordinary loss of $98.6 
million on its 2004 federal tax return.45 
The Service in 2009 issued a notice of deficiency to the taxpayer on 
grounds that the loss was a capital loss and the taxpayer subsequently filed 
a petition in the Tax Court.46 The taxpayer’s position was that section 
165(g) should be inapplicable because the securities had value when they 
were abandoned.47 The Service asserted that the abandonment should be 
treated as a deemed sale pursuant to section 165(g) and as such should be 
characterized as a capital loss.48 The Tax Court then issued a sua sponte 
order requesting briefs as to whether section 1234A was applicable and, if 
so, it would be a capital loss from the abandonment.49 
As noted, Section 1234A provides in pertinent part that 
Gain or loss attributable to the cancellation, lapse, 
expiration, or other termination of—(1) a right or 
obligation . . . with respect to property which is (or on 
acquisition would be) a capital asset in the hands of the 
taxpayer . . . shall be treated as gain or loss from the sale 
of a capital asset.50 
The taxpayer contended, “that under section 1234A a right or 
obligation with respect to property refers only to a contractual or other 





43 Id. at 537-38. 
44 Pilgrim’s Pride, 141 T.C. at 537-38. 
45 Id. at 538. 
46 Id. at 539. 
47 Opening Brief, supra note 31, at 19- 20. 
48 Opening Brief for Respondent, supra note 13, at 14-21. 
49 Pilgrim’s Pride v. Comm’r, 779 F.3d 311, 313 (5th Cir. 2015). 
50 I.R.C. § 1234A (2002). 
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derivative right to property and not property rights inherent in the 
ownership of the property.”51 The Tax Court rejected the taxpayer’s 
assertion holding “that that the plain meaning of the phrase ‘a right or 
obligation . . . with respect to property’ encompasses the property rights 
inherent in intangible property as well as ancillary or derivative 
contractual rights.”52 In support of its position, the Tax Court reasoned that 
“[i]n its everyday usage the phrase ‘rights with respect to property’ 
includes the rights inherent in the ownership of the property, including 
stock.”53 Furthermore, the Tax Court noted that “[m]ost significantly, 
Congress has used the phrase ‘with respect to property’ in other provisions 
of the Code to include rights arising out of the ownership of the property 
or characteristics of the property.”54 
The Tax Court also rebuffed the taxpayer’s contention: 
[T]hat the legislative history to the 1997 amendment of 
section 1234A [including no example of a termination of 
direct stock ownership] shows that Congress intended that 
section 1234A apply only to contractual and other 
derivative rights and obligations with respect to property 
and not to the inherent property rights and obligations 
arising from the ownership of the property.55 
The Tax Court’s response to the taxpayer’s assertion was that “we do 
not think that the examples do more than show that section 1234A applies 
broadly to derivative contractual rights and obligations as well as inherent 
property rights.”56 The Tax Court also observed that “the Senate Finance 
Committee was critical of the existing law because it taxed similar 
economic transactions differently . . . .”57 The court indicated that “[t]he 
intended effects [made by the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997] of extending 
section 1234A to all types of property that are capital assets ‘would be to 
remove the effective ability of a taxpayer to elect the character of gains 
and losses from certain transactions . . . .’”58 The Tax Court also noted that 
an example in the legislative history involving the redemption of a bond is 
                                                                                                             
51 Pilgrim’s Pride, 141 T.C. at 542. 
52 Id. at 544. 
53 Id. at 543. 
54 Id. at 544 (citing §§ 126(e), 704(c)(1)(A), 772(c)(3)(A), 877A(h)(1)(A), 954(i)(4)(A), 
301(a), and 993(a)(1)(E)). 
55 Id. at 545. Pursuant to The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Congress amended section 
1234A(1) by replacing the phrase “personal property (as defined in section 1092(d)(1)” 
with the term ‘“property.” Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 1003(a), 111 Stat. 788, 909-910 (1997). 
56 Pilgrim’s Pride, 141 T.C. at 547. 
57 Id. at 548. 
58 Id. 
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further support for its position because “a bond which, like a share of 
stock, is intangible property--a bundle of contractual rights.”59 
The Tax Court also rejected the taxpayer’s claim that amendments 
made in 2008 to Treasury Regulation section 1.165-5, promulgating 
Regulation section 1.165-5(i),60 evidences that the Department of Treasury 
did not then subscribe to the belief that section 1234A was applicable to 
the abandonment of securities.61 Treasury Regulation section 1.165-5(i), 
as noted above, provides in pertinent part that “[i]f the abandoned security 
is a capital asset and is not described in section 165(g)(3) . . . the resulting 
loss is treated as a loss from the sale or exchange . . . of a capital asset.” In 
its dismissal of the taxpayer’s contention, the Tax Court stated that “the 
regulation does not create an exception to section 1234A; it is the more 
specific provision of section 165(g)(3) that creates an exception for 
affiliated corporations. Thus, [Treasury Regulation] section 1.165-5(i) . . . 
gives effect to, and is consistent with, section 1234A . . . .”62 
Finally, the Tax Court rejected the taxpayer’s assertion that the 
Commissioner’s failure to revise Revenue Ruling 93-80,63 after the 
amendments to section 1234A under the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997,64 
constitutes further support for its position that the provision is inapposite 
to the abandonment of securities. Revenue Ruling 93-80 holds that “[a] 
loss from the abandonment or worthlessness of a partnership interest will 
be ordinary if there is neither an actual nor a deemed distribution to the 
partner . . . .”65 The Tax Court stressed that the ruling “was issued four 
years before section 1234A was amended in 1997 to apply to all property 
that is (or would be if acquired) a capital asset in the hands of the 
taxpayer.”66 Furthermore, the Tax Court commented that the Service “is 
not required to assert a particular position as soon as the statute authorizes 
such an interpretation, whether that position is taken in a regulation or in 
a revenue ruling.”67 
The Tax Court never addressed the applicability of section 165(g)(1) 
to Pilgrim’s Pride. The taxpayer filed a motion for reconsideration, which 
                                                                                                             
59 Id. at 547. 
60 Abandonment of Stocks or Other Securities, 73 Fed. Reg. 13,124 (Mar. 12, 2008) (to 
be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
61 Pilgrim’s Pride, 141 T.C. at 549. 
62 Id. 
63 Rev. Rul. 93-80, 1993-2 C.B. 239 (1993). 
64 Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 1003(a), 111 Stat 788, 909-910 
(1997). 
65 Rev. Rul. 93-80, 1993-2 C.B. 239 (1993). 
66 Pilgrim’s Pride, 141 T.C. at 550. 
67 Id. 
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was denied.68 The taxpayer subsequently appealed the Tax Court decision 
to the Fifth Circuit. 
B. The Fifth Circuit Decision 
On appeal, the decision of the Tax Court was reversed and the Fifth 
Circuit concluded that section “1234A(1) only applies to the termination 
of contractual or derivative rights, and not to the abandonment of capital 
assets . . . .”69 The Court of Appeals observed that section 1234A was 
enacted as part of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 198170 to address 
tax straddles, which it defined as “transactions in which taxpayers acquire 
offsetting contractual positions to obtain tax benefits without any 
economic risk.”71 The Fifth Circuit cited to an example in the legislative 
history wherein the “taxpayer simultaneously enter[ed] into a contract to 
buy German marks for future delivery and a contract to sell German marks 
for future delivery with very little risk.”72 Congress was concerned that 
under pre-section 1234A law, in the event of a decline in the price of 
German marks, taxpayer would cancel his obligation to buy the marks 
achieving an ordinary loss and obtain capital gain treatment from 
assigning his contract to sell the marks.73 
The Fifth Circuit pointed out that the Service had conceded that 
section “1234A does not directly apply to the abandonment of a capital 
asset itself.”74 The Court of Appeals then rejected the Service’s assertion 
that section 1234A “indirectly applies to the abandonment of a capital 
asset because the abandonment of a capital asset involves the termination 
of certain rights and obligations ‘inherent in’ those assets.”75 The Fifth 
Circuit indicated that “Congress does not legislate in logic puzzles . . . .”76 
The Court of Appeals quoted from the Supreme Court that it must “assume 
that ‘the ordinary meaning of [statutory] language accurately expresses the 
legislative purpose.”77 
The Fifth Circuit also noted that the Service failed to identify “any 
other statute referring to so-called ‘inherent rights, as ‘rights[s] or 
obligation[s] with respect to a capital asset.’”78 Furthermore, the Court of 
                                                                                                             
68 Pilgrim’s Pride v. Comm’r, 779 F.3d 311, 313 (5th Cir. 2015). 
69 Id. at 312. 
70 The Economic Recovery Act of 1981, Pub L. No. 97-34, § 507(a), 95 Stat. 172, 333 
(1981). 
71 Pilgrim’s Pride, 779 F.3d at 314. 
72 Id. at 315 (citing S. Rep. No 97-144, at 171 (1981). 
73 Id. at 314-15 (citing S. Rep. No. 97-144, at 171 (1981)). 
74 Id. at 315 (emphasis from the original). 
75 Id. (emphasis from the original). 
76 Pilgrim’s Pride v. Comm’r, 779 F.3d 311 (5th Cir. 2015). 
77 Id. (quoting Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc, 557 U.S. 167, 175 (2009)). 
78 Id. 
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Appeals maintained that the Service had not cited any case that had 
interpreted section “1234A(1) –or any similarly worded statute—in the 
manner . . . [it] proposes.”79 
As the final nail in the coffin to the Service’s contention regarding 
inherent rights, the Fifth Circuit commented that its argument would 
render section 1234A(2) “superfluous.”80 Section 1234A(2) provides for 
capital gain or loss treatment with respect “to the cancellation, lapse, 
expiration, or other termination of . . . (2) a section 1256 contract . . . 
which is a capital asset in the hands of the taxpayer.”81 The Fifth Circuit 
indicated that “the termination of any Section 1256 contract which is a 
capital asset would terminate those inherent rights and obligations . . . As 
a result § 1234A(2) would not serve any function.”82 
The Court of Appeals also dismissed the alternative argument put 
forward by the Service that section “165(g) requires Pilgrim’s Pride’s 
abandonment loss to be treated as capital.”83 The Fifth Circuit observed 
that the Service’s position was irreconcilable with earlier decisions that it 
had rendered. The Court of Appeals quoted Echols v. Commissioner that 
“[p]roperty cannot be treated as worthless for tax purposes if at the time it, 
objectively, has substantial value.”84 Furthermore, the Court of Appeals 
commented that in a second Fifth Circuit decision that involved the same 
taxpayer, the court had stated that “[w]orthlessness and abandonment are 
separate and distinct concepts and are not, as urged by the Commissioner, 
simply two sides of the same coin . . . .”85 
II. AN INTRODUCTION TO SOME STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
METHODOLOGIES 
In Pilgrim’s Pride, the courts faced two provisions of the Internal 
Revenue Code, section 165(g)(1) and section 1234A, neither of which 
clearly address the tax consequence of an abandonment of a security and 
the strong possibility that the issue wasn’t even considered when the 
provisions, or in the case of section 165(g)(1), its predecessor, was 
                                                                                                             
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 316. 
81 I.R.C. § 1234A (2012). 
82 Pilgrim’s Pride, 779 F.3d at 316. The Court of Appeals notes in a footnote that the 
Service’s interpretation of § 1234A is also inconsistent with two administrative actions by 
the Service. First, that Rev. Rul. 93-80 allowed an ordinary loss on the abandonment of a 
partnership interest, and second, that Treas. Reg. § 1.165-5(i) provides that an abandoned 
security is per se worthless resulting in a capital loss under § 165(g)(1). Id. at 317, n. 8. 
83 Id. at 317. 
84 Id. (quoting Echols v. Comm’r, 935 F.2d 703, 707 (5th Cir. 1991). 
85 Id. (quoting Echols v. Comm’r, 950 F.2d 209, 211 (5th Cir. 1991). 
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enacted. Under these circumstances, how should a court interpret the 
meaning of these sections with respect to the issue at hand, i.e., the 
character of a loss upon the abandonment of a security having objective 
value? In this respect, it may be worthwhile to consider what some 
scholars have said about statutory interpretation and then to reflect on 
some methodologies for addressing the problem. 
The late Professor Edward H. Levi, who served as Dean of the 
University of Chicago Law School, President of the University of 
Chicago, and Attorney General of the United States, wrote about judges 
that “[w]e mean to accomplish what the legislature intended . . . The 
difficulty is what the legislature intended is ambiguous.”86 In United States 
v. Klinger, Judge Learned Hand commented that 
When we ask what Congress ‘intended,’ usually there can 
be no answer, if what we mean is what any person or 
group of persons actually had in mind. Flinch as we may, 
what we do, and must do, is to project ourselves, as best 
we can, into the position of those who uttered the words, 
and to impute to them how they would have dealt with the 
concrete occasion. He who supposes that he can be certain 
of the result is the least fitted for the attempt.87 
Professor Michael Sinclair observed that “[s]tatutory reasoning is the 
process by which a statute is brought to bear on a particular set of facts. 
Statutes are verbal formulations of some generality. Judicial decisions are 
particular. Therein lies the difficulty.”88 
The Supreme Court set forth in United States v. Quality Stores, Inc. 
that “[t]he beginning point [for applying a statute to particular case] is the 
relevant statutory text.”89 What, if any, the next steps should be is in some 
dispute. Professors Noel B. Cunningham and James R. Repetti wrote that 
“[s]cholars have identified four methods of statutory interpretation that 
courts have used: intentionalism, purposivism, textualism, and the 
                                                                                                             
86 EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 30 (2013, originally 
published 1949). 
87 United States v. Klinger, 199 F.2d 645, 648 (2d Cir. 1952), aff’d per curiam, 345 U.S. 
979 (1953). 
88 MICHAEL SINCLAIR, GUIDE TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 17 (2013). 
89 United States v. Quality Stores, Inc. 134 S.Ct. 1395, 1399 (2014). The Supreme Court 
has also stated that “[s]tatutory construction must begin with the language employed by 
Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately 
expresses the legislative purpose.” Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 
189, 194 (1985). 
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practical reason (or dynamic) method.”90 Professors Cunningham and 
Repetti describe intentionalism as an approach that 
[S]eeks to determine what the legislature intended the 
statute to mean by examining committee reports and floor 
statements by sponsors. This method . . . reflects a view 
that in interpreting a statute, a court acts as the agent of 
Congress. Under this view, it is appropriate to consult 
legislative history, even where the statutory language is 
clear, to insure that the interpretation does not conflict 
with the legislature’s intent . . . .91 
In comparison, “t]he purposivist . . . does not inquire what the 
legislature intended the statute to mean, but rather asks what the statute’s 
purpose was as the time of enactment in order to interpret the statute in a 
manner consistent with that purpose.”92 According to Professors 
Cunningham and Repetti, the key distinction one makes between 
intentionalism and purposivism 
[I]s that while the intentionalists try to determine what the 
legislature’s intent actually was at the time of enactment, 
the purposivists try to determine what the statute would 
have meant at the time of enactment when read by a 
reasonably intelligent and informed reader.93 
To accomplish this objective, the purposivist also considers legislative 
history.94 
There is some dispute among the scholars as to what role legislative 
history should play in statutory construction and what constitutes valid 
legislative history for this purpose. According to Bradford L. Ferguson, 
Fredric W. Hickman, and Donald C. Lubick, in their article, Reexamining 
the Nature and Role of Tax Legislative History in Light of the Changing 
Realities of the Process, “[l]egitimate tax legislative history, insofar as it 
is explicit and specific, should be considered as having virtue parity with 
the statute itself.”95 Among their arguments for deference to legislative 
                                                                                                             
90 Noel B. Cunningham & James R. Repetti, Textualism and Tax Shelters, 24 VA. TAX 
REV. 1, 7 (2004). 
91 Id. at 7-8 (footnotes omitted). 
92 Id. at 8 (footnote omitted). 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Bradford L. Ferguson, Fredric W. Hickman & Donald C. Lubick, Reexamining the 
Nature and Role of Tax Legislative History in Light of the Changing Realities of the 
Process, 67 TAXES 804, 823 (1989). They defined “[l]egitimate [tax] legislative history” 
to “include . . . expressions of congressional intent set forth, in substantially similar forms, 
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history in federal taxation is that the Internal Revenue Code is the 
“lengthiest, most complex, most internally interrelated statute on the 
books today”96 and that tax legislative history is “much more focused and 
comprehensive than legislative history in nontax areas.”97 
In contrast to the first two approaches, i.e., intentionalism and 
purposivism, “[t]he textualist . . . eschews all legislative history, 
considering it highly suspect.”98 Professors Cunningham and Repetti note 
that “[t]he textualist looks to the statute’s language and other sources to 
identify the text’s meaning.”99 A major proponent of textualism, or more 
aptly originalism,100 the late Justice Antonin Scalia wrote in his concurring 
opinion in Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co. that 
                                                                                                             
in both the Ways and Means and Finance Committee reports, in the Statement of the 
Managers issued with respect to a conference report, or in orchestrated floor colloquies 
involving the respective bill managers.” Id. They contrast this with post enactment 
explanations such as the Joint Committee on Taxation’s Blue Book. See also, e.g., United 
States v. Woods, 134 S. Ct. 557 (2013) where Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, stated 
with respect to consideration given Blue Books that 
Blue Books are prepared by the staff of the Joint Committee on 
Taxation as commentaries on recently passed tax laws. They are 
‘written after passage of the legislation and therefore d[o] not inform 
the decisions of the members of Congress who vot[e] in favor of the 
[law]’ . . . . We have held that such ‘[p]ost-enactment legislative 
history (a contradiction in terms) is not a legitimate tool of statutory 
interpretation.’ . . . .While we have relied on similar documents in the 
past, . . . our more recent precedents disapprove of that practice. Of 
course the Blue Book, like a law review article, may be relevant to the 
extent it is persuasive. 
Id. at 568; but see Michael Livingston, Congress, the Courts and the Code: Legislative 
History and the Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 69 TEX. L. REV. 819, 885-86 (1991). 
Professor Livingston maintained 
[t]here is no clear line between contemporaneous and subsequent 
commentary on a tax bill . . . the Blue Book appears to be on similar 
ground with the committee reports: both are unenacted expressions of 
intent that are persuasive to the extent they explain the constitutionally 
enacted statute and less persuasive when they exceed this function. 
Id. at 885-86 (footnote omitted). 
96 Michael Livingston, Congress, the Courts and the Code: Legislative History and the 
Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 69 TEX. L. REV. 819 (1991). 
97 Id. 
98 Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 90, at 8 (footnote omitted). 
99 Id. 
100 Justice Scalia espouses “originalism,” which is “the original public meaning of the 
text at the time of its enactment.” See Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of 
‘Faint-Hearted’ Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7, 9 (2006). The reference in the title of 
the article was Justice Scalia’s comment in an earlier lecture that “I hasten to confess that 
in a crunch I may prove a faint-hearted originalist. I cannot imagine myself, any more than 
any other federal judge, upholding a statute that imposes the punishment of flogging” even 
though it was not considered “cruel and unusual punishment” in 1791, i.e., at the time the 
Eighth Amendment became part of the Constitution. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The 
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The meaning of terms on the statute books ought to be 
determined, not on the basis of which meaning can be 
shown to have been understood by a larger handful of the 
Members of Congress; but rather on the basis of which 
meaning is (1) most in accord with context and ordinary 
usage, and thus most likely to have been understood by 
the whole Congress which voted on the words of the 
statute (not to mention the citizens subject to it), and (2) 
most compatible with the surrounding body of law into 
which the provision must be integrated—a compatibility 
which, by a benign fiction, we assume Congress always 
has in mind.101 
Justice Scalia and Brian A. Garner in their book, Reading Law: The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts, asserted that “[a] system of democratically 
adopted laws . . . makes no sense . . . without the belief that words convey 
discernible meanings and without the commitment of legal arbiters to 
abide by those meanings.”102 
A court employing textualism “is not limited to examining the text of 
the statute, itself, and related statutes, but may also consult various textual 
authorities existing at the time of enactment, such as dictionaries, case law, 
and possibly treatises.”103 Justice Scalia declared that the textualist should 
pursue “‘objectified’ intent-the intent that a reasonable person would 
gather from the text of the law, placed alongside the remainder of the 
corpus juris.”104 
                                                                                                             
Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 864 (1989). Justice Antonin Scalia and Professor Bryan 
Garner gave an example of and the rationale for “originalism” as follows:  
If you want to understand now what Queen Anne was saying about St. 
Paul’s Cathedral, you do not ask what the phrase awful, artificial, and 
amusing means today. That alone is reason enough for using 
originalism to interpret private documents. But where public 
documents—constitutions, statutes, ordinances, regulations—are at 
issue, there is a still more important reason: Originalism is the only 
approach that is compatible with democracy. 
ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL 
TEXTS 82 (2012) (emphasis in original). 
101 Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J. concurring) 
(emphasis in original). 
102 Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, supra note 100, at xxix. 
103 Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 90, at 9 (footnote omitted). 
104 ANTONIN SCALIA, COMMON-LAW COURTS IN A CIVIL-LAW SYSTEM: THE ROLE OF 
UNITED STATES FEDERAL COURTS IN INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, IN A 
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 3, 17 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). Justice Antonin Scalia and 
Professor Bryan Garner advised judges that when they interpret legislation they engage in 
“(1) giving effect to the text that lawmakers have adopted and that the people are entitled 
18 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:1 
 
Professors Cunningham and Repetti averred that “the ascendancy of 
textualism has had its greatest impact by facilitating the promotion and 
sale of ‘abusive’ tax shelters.”105 They were concerned that “textualism 
permits the attorney to ignore or reduce the importance of legislative 
history that would argue against the desired tax results [and that] . . . 
textualism challenges the validity of applying various judicial doctrines to 
complex statutory provisions.”106 
The fourth methodology, cited by Professors Cunningham and 
Repetti, i.e., practical reasoning or dynamic interpretation, was developed 
by Professors William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey.107 According 
to Professors Cunningham and Repetti, this approach “holds that all three 
foundational methods are not only flawed but also do not reflect what the 
courts actually do.”108 Professors Cunningham and Repetti point out that 
this approach “does not reject the foundational methods per se, but rather 
‘refuses to privilege intention, purpose or text as the sole touchstone of 
interpretation.’”109 Professors Eskridge and Frickey opine that a court 
should 
[L]ook at a broad range of evidence -- text, historical 
evidence, and the text’s evolution -- and thus form a 
preliminary view of the statute. The interpreter then 
develops that preliminary view by testing various possible 
interpretations against the multiple criteria of fidelity to 
the text, historical accuracy, and conformity to 
circumstances and values. Each criterion is relevant, yet 
none necessarily trumps the others.110 
Professor Eskridge in a later work indicated that the focus of the court 
should be 
[N]ot only what the statute means abstractly, or even on 
the basis of legislative history, but also what it ought to 
mean in terms of the needs and goals of our present day 
society . . . sometimes the circumstances will be 
                                                                                                             
to rely on, and (2) giving no effect to lawmakers’ unenacted desires.” Scalia & Garner, 
supra note 100, at 29. 
105 Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 90, at 20. 
106 Id. at 62. 
107 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical 
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990). 
108 Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 90, at 9 (citing Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 
107, at 321-22). 
109 Id. (quoting Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 107, at 345). 
110 Id. at 9-10 (citing Eskridge &. Frickey, supra note 107, at 352). 
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materially different from those contemplated by the 
statutory drafters, and in that event any application of the 
statute will be dynamic in a strong sense, going against 
the drafters’ expectations, which have been negated 
because important assumptions have been undone.111 
Other academics have used different terms for dividing the universe 
of statutory interpretation methodologies. For Professor William D. 
Popkin, a noted income tax as well as statutory construction scholar, there 
are two approaches, “pragmatism” and “anti-pragmatism.”112 He indicated 
that “in one camp are the pragmatists who view judging as a lawmaking 
partnership with the legislature.”113 He referred to Seventh Circuit Judge 
and prolific author Richard A. Posner and Professor Eskridge as “the best 
known advocates of pragmatic judging.”114 
Judge Posner defined his version of “a pragmatic approach to the law” 
as asking “judges to focus on the practical consequences of their 
decisions . . . .”115 With respect to interpreting the Constitution, in 
criticizing textualism, Judge Posner commented that “[l]ike most judges, 
Supreme Court Justices prefer in their opinions to remain on the semantic 
surface of issues, arguing over the meaning of malleable terms such as 
‘public use’ or ‘cruel and unusual punishments’ rather than over the 
consequences of adopting one meaning over another. Trying to decide 
what a term means by staring at it is a form of naval gazing.”116 
Professor Popkin notes that “the anti-pragmatists reach their 
conclusions by very different routes.”117 He writes that “[Justice Antonin] 
Scalia and [Harvard Law School Professor John] Manning are textualists 
who rely on various arguments that the Constitution prevents the judge 
from being a pragmatic lawmaking partner.”118 According to Professor 
Popkin, other anti-pragmatists include Harvard Law Professor Einer 
                                                                                                             
111 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 50 n.7 (1994) 
(quoting Arthur Phelps, Factors Influencing Judges in Interpreting Statutes, 3 VAND. L. 
REV. 456, 469 (1950)). 
112 WILLIAM D. POPKIN, THE JUDICIAL ROLE: STATUTORY INTERPRETATION & THE 
PRAGMATIC JUDICIAL PARTNER xi-xii (2013). 
113 Id. at xi. 
114 Id. In an earlier work, Professor Popkin advocated a “collaborative model of statutory 
interpretation.” William D. Popkin, The Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpretation, 
61 S. CAL. L. REV. 541, 543 (1988). 
115 Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term Foreword: A Political Court, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 31, 90 (2005) (footnote omitted). 
116 Id. at 98-99. At least with respect to the application of pragmatism to Constitutional 
interpretation, he advocates the Supreme Court should be “restrained in the exercise of its 
power.” Id. at 102. 
117 Popkin, supra note 112, at xii. 
118 Id. 
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Elhauge, who “adopts a version of intentionalism—what he calls judicial 
deference to ‘enactable preferences,’ stressing democratic values.”119 
Professor Popkin is firmly in the pragmatists school for construing a 
statute. He “argues that pragmatic judicial partnering is both descriptively 
accurate and normatively desirable. It describes and justifies judging as a 
creative act of judgment rather than discovery of the right answer in the 
text, legislative intent, or in a decision about policy consequences.”120 
Professor Popkin asserted that this style of judging which is “persuasion 
through the transparent judicial opinion that acknowledges indeterminacy 
and the potential relevance of policy considerations” is superior to the 
alternative.121 
Professor Paul R. Caron, another noted tax law scholar, splits the 
statutory interpretation world into three groups: “intentionalism”, 
“purposivism” and “new textualism.”122 He writes that 
Under the traditional intentionalism approach, legislative 
history is used in conjunction with the statutory text to 
divine the legislative intent behind a particular provision. 
In contrast, the purposivism approach, as formulated by 
Professors Hart and Sacks, seeks to construe a statute in 
light of the goals the legislature had in mind when it 
enacted the statute. Finally, the new textualism approach 
of Judge Easterbrook and Justice Scalia places primary 
emphasis on the literal language of the statute.123 
Professor Caron was critical of “[s]ome courts and commentators 
[that] have seized upon . . . [the tax law’s] complexity and the nature of 
the tax legislative process to justify approaches to statutory construction 
that differ from those employed in construing nontax statutes.”124 
                                                                                                             
119 Id. Another leading anti-pragmatist Professor Popkin indicates is Harvard Law 
Professor Adrian Vermeule, who “is a literalist who does not base his approach on 
constitutional or democratic values. He instead relies on an institutional model of judging 
that emphasizes the more or less certain costs and uncertain benefits that judges encounter 
in trying to find the right answer . . . .” Id. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 81. 
122 Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don’t Let Your Babies Grow Up to Be Tax 
Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REV. 517, 540 (1994). 
123 Id. (footnotes omitted) (referring to HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE 
LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (10th ed. 
1958); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59 (1988); Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary 
Legal Analysis, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 581 (1989-90)). 
124 Id. at 531. 
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Another noted tax expert, Professor Lawrence Zelenak, has promoted 
the position that in construing a statute, “[t]he statutory context may 
clearly indicate that the only sensible, logical interpretation is a nonliteral 
interpretation. If this is the case, the nonliteral interpretation should be 
regarded as the statute’s meaning.”125 He maintained that “[n]onliteral 
interpretations are justified primarily, if not exclusively, when a statute 
must be applied to fact patterns that Congress did not consider when it 
enacted the statute.”126 
Professor Michael Livingston indicated he “would go further than 
[Professor] Zelenak”127 in stressing the importance of context in 
interpreting an Internal Revenue Code provision. Professor Livingston 
stated “that contextual interpretation is not only appropriate in individual 
tax cases, but is in fact the dominant approach—and properly so—to tax 
interpretation.” 128 He commented that “[f]ew if any tax terms have a 
‘plain’ meaning that can be divorced from the statutory and decisional 
context in which the terms arise.”129 Professor Livingston asserted that 
contextual interpretation “in many respects follows the Hart and Sacks 
approach, identifying the underlying purpose of the statute and 
interpreting individual provisions consistently with that purpose.”130 He 
argued that legislative history has a vital role but that “[c]ourts [should] . . . 
restrict legislative history to its proper explanatory function . . . .”131 He 
counselled against a court “refus[ing] to consider any legislative history, 
or, at the opposite extreme, if they seek to reconstruct the legislative 
process in deciding each tax case.”132 
III. OBSERVATIONS 
A. Section 165(g)(1) and Abandonment of Securities 
Had Regulation section 1.165-5(i) been promulgated prior to the 
abandonment of the Securities in 2004, this would have been an easy case 
for the courts to decide assuming the taxpayer continued to challenge 
                                                                                                             
125 Lawrence Zelenak, Thinking About Nonliteral Interpretations of the Internal Revenue 
Code, 64 N.C.L. REV. 623, 637 (1986). 
126 Id. at 659 (footnote omitted). 
127 Michael Livingston, Congress, the Courts and the Code: Legislative History and the 
Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 69 TEX. L. REV. 819, 830 (1991). 
128 Id. at 830-31. 
129 Id. at 831. 
130 Id. at 829. 
131 Id. at 886. 
132 Id. (advising Congress that they could assist the judiciary “by providing more of the 
‘why’ and less of the ‘how’ in the legislative history”). 
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capital loss treatment. The courts should and presumably would utilize the 
test set forth for deference to the judgment of an administrative agency by 
the Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc.,133 i.e., “whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left 
open by Congress”134 and conclude the regulation met the test. Because 
the regulation was legally ineffective for the 2004 transaction, the courts 
faced a much more difficult but more thought-provoking exercise that 
required an analysis of the applicability of section 165(g)(1) and section 
1234A. That is, should either section 165(g)(1) or section 1234A be 
interpreted as obligating the taxpayer to treat the loss as a capital loss? 
Prior to the promulgation of Treasury regulation 1.165-5(i), there was 
certainly support, including both a revenue ruling as well as decisions in 
the Fifth Circuit, for the view that an abandonment of a security should be 
treated as an ordinary loss. Nevertheless, even prior to the effective date 
of Treasury Regulation section 1.165-5(i), a logical argument, consistent 
with some of the methodologies employed in statutory interpretation, can 
be made that a taxpayer, such as Pilgrim’s Pride should not be accorded 
ordinary loss treatment under section 165(a) upon abandonment of 
securities, when a sale for the offered $20 million or any amount, no matter 
how small (but less than basis) would have resulted in a capital loss. That 
                                                                                                             
133 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984). 
134 Id. at 866. The often-quoted two-prong test for deference in Chevron is: 
[f]irst, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to 
the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is 
the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give 
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, 
the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise 
question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own 
construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an 
administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or 
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court 
is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction 
of the statute. 
Id. at 842-43 (footnotes omitted). The other frequently cited passage from Chevron on 
deference is that “legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are 
arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” Id. at 844 (footnote omitted). 
In Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 
45 (2011), the Supreme Court indicated this standard also applied to Treasury Department 
interpretative regulations. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. and Research v. United States at 
45. It should be noted, however, that on June 8, 2016, the House Judiciary Committee 
reported out H.R. 4768, the Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2016, which, if 
enacted, according to a statement at the markup, by the Chairman of the Judiciary 
Committee, Rep. Robert “Bob” Goodlatte (R-VA) would “legislatively overturn . . . the 
Chevron doctrine.” On July 12, 2016, the U.S. House of Representatives passed H.R. 4768. 
The House of Representatives passed a similar provision contained in the Regulatory 
Accountability Act of 2017, H.R. 5, on January 11, 2017. 
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is, section 165(g)(1) should be read to treat an abandoned security as 
worthless. 
The case for this position is that had it focused on the issue when 
section 165(g)(1) and its predecessor was enacted, Congress would find, 
or at least should find, that ordinary loss treatment for an abandoned 
security, even if it has objective value prior to its abandonment, to be a 
“peculiar and anomalous result.”135 The policy rationale behind section 
165(g)(1), i.e., that a taxpayer should not be accorded ordinary loss 
treatment when a security becomes worthless, but obtain a capital loss if 
the security is sold or exchanged for a de minimis amount of consideration, 
equally applies to a security abandonment. It makes no sense that a 
taxpayer can obtain a better tax treatment, i.e., ordinary loss vs. capital 
loss, by abandoning a security rather than by selling or exchanging it. 
Certainly, construing the statute in such a manner, i.e., an abandoned 
security is deemed worthless because it has no remaining value to the 
taxpayer, would be consistent with “conformity to contemporary 
circumstances and values.”136 
As discussed above, on its face, Treasury Regulation section 1.165-
5(i) is not effective for Pilgrim’s Pride since this regulation only applies 
prospectively, consistent with section 7805(b), “to any abandonment of 
stock or other securities after March 12, 2008.”137 Courts have refrained 
from applying a regulation prior to its effective date.138 This does not mean 
that a court should be oblivious to the policy issues raised by the 
regulation. 
As noted, one argument that abandoned securities should come within 
section 165(g)(1) and thus give rise to a capital loss is that by the taxpayer 
abandoning the securities, the securities have become worthless to it. That 
is, an abandoned security should be treated as per se worthless for purposes 
of section 165(g)(1). While the decisions involve different legal issues and 
concern the abandonment of a partnership interest and not a security, there 
                                                                                                             
135 The language “peculiar and anomalous results” was cited in the Proposed Rulemaking 
for Prop. Reg. § 1.165-5(i) as follows:  
[t]he legislative history of the predecessor of section 165(g) indicates 
that the provision was enacted to remove the ‘peculiar and anomalous 
results’ that followed from treating losses from the worthlessness of 
securities as ordinary losses or deductions, and losses from the sale or 
exchange of securities as capital losses, because both losses represent 
a loss of capital in a transaction entered into for profit. See H. Rep. No. 
1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., at 18-19 (1938). 
72 Fed. Reg. 41468 (proposed July 30, 2007) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
136 Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 90, at 10 (citing Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 
107, at 352). 
137 Treas. Reg. § 1.165-5(i)(2) (2008). 
138 See, e.g., Hunter v. Comm’r, 87 T.C.M. (CCH) 1143 n.3 (2004). 
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is certainly somewhat adverse precedent to this position by the Fifth 
Circuit in Echols v Commissioner (referred to by the Fifth Circuit in 
Pilgrim’s Pride and hereinafter as “Echols II”)139 and its predecessor 
(referred to hereinafter as “Echols I”).140 In Echols II, as quoted by the 
Fifth Circuit in Pilgrim’s Pride, the court said “[w]orthlessness and 
abandonment are separate and distinct concepts and are not, as urged by 
the Commissioner, simply two sides of the same coin . . . .”141 
In Echols II, the Fifth Circuit’s denied the Service’s petition for a 
rehearing requesting that the Fifth Circuit withdraw its original “alternate 
holding [in Echols I] that the taxpayers were entitled . . . to take a loss 
deduction under Code § 165(a) based on their determination, grounded in 
demonstrable facts, that their interest in the partnership was 
‘worthless.’”142 The Court of Appeals rejected the Service’s position 
“which, if accepted, would totally subsume ‘worthlessness’ in 
‘abandonment.’”143 
In Echols I, the Fifth Circuit set forth that “a property cannot be treated 
as worthless for tax loss purposes if at the time it, objectively, has 
substantial value.”144 This obviously undermined the argument that an 
abandoned security having real worth prior to its abandonment can be 
considered worthless for purposes of section 165(g)(1). This was cited by 
the Fifth Circuit in Pilgrim’s Pride for its rejection of the Service’s 
alternative argument that “a security becomes ‘worthless’ when it is 
‘useless’ to its owner, regardless of its market value.”145 
In Echols I, the taxpayers (John C Echols and his wife Deanna O. 
Nichols) owned an interest (initially 37.5% but later 75%) in a Texas 
                                                                                                             
139 See, Echols v. Comm’r, 950 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1991). 
140 Echols v. Comm’r, 935 F.2d 703 (5th Cir. 1991). 
141 Pilgrim’s Pride Corp. v. Comm’r, 779 F.3d 311, 317 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Echols, 
950 F.2d at 211). 
142 Echols, 950 F.2d at 210. 
143 Id. at 211 (indicating that “the Commissioner would have us hold that there can be no 
loss deduction under Code § 165 without either a transfer of title or an act of 
abandonment . . . . Despite the Commissioner’s wishful thinking to the contrary, taxpayers 
are entitled to take loss deductions under Code § 165(a), not only for assets that the 
taxpayer has abandoned, with or without their having become worthless, but also for assets 
that have become worthless, with or without having been abandoned.”). 
144 Echols, 935 F.2d at 707. 
145 Pilgrim’s Pride, 779 F.3d at 317; see Reply Brief of Appellant at 22, Pilgrim’s Pride 
Corp. v. Comm’r, 779 F.3d 311 (5th Cir. 2015) (No. 14-60295)(emphasis in original) 
(citing to Boehm v. Comm’r, 326 U.S. 287, 292-93 (1945); Genecov v. United States, 412 
F.2d 556, 560-61 (5th Cir. 1969); Miami Beach Bay Shore Co. v. Comm’r, 136 F.2d 408, 
409 (5th Cir. 1943)) (citing several additional cases in support of its argument that 
“securities must be both objectively and subjectively worthless to be considered worthless 
for purposes of section 165(g),” however the cited cases do not address the factual situation 
present in Pilgrim’s Pride). 
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limited partnership whose only asset was a tract of unimproved real estate 
in Houston, Texas. A third party developer (hereinafter, “the Developer”) 
also had an interest in this land. In 1976, the Developer defaulted on a 
payment owed for this land when its value had declined, and John Echols 
called a meeting of the partners, at which time he indicated he would no 
longer contribute funds needed for the mortgage and ad valorem payments 
due on the land. Eventually the land was foreclosed upon. 
Near the outset of its analysis with respect to the character of the 
taxpayers’ loss, the Fifth Circuit in Echols I stated that there was an 
important 
[D]istinction between ‘abandonment’ and 
‘worthlessness’; either concept can, under proper 
circumstances, justify a deduction pursuant to I.R.C. 
§ 165(a), but each is different in theory, and the elements 
of one are separate and distinct from the elements of the 
other.146 
The Fifth Circuit, in Echols I determined that the taxpayers were 
entitled to a loss deduction under section 165(a) on the basis of 
abandonment of their interest in the partnership as well as on the basis of 
worthlessness.147 
The Service itself has recognized that abandonment and worthlessness 
are not always coterminous in that something can be worthless even 
though not abandoned. In Revenue Ruling 54-581, the Service held that if 
property became worthless in a prior year, “the taxpayer may not, by 
subsequent act of abandonment establish a deductible loss for the year of 
such abandonment.”148 Treasury Regulation section 1.165-2(a) reiterates 
this point by providing that “the taxable year in which the loss is sustained 
is not necessarily the taxable year in which the overt act of abandonment, 
or the loss of title to the property, occurs.”149 
In Citron v. Commissioner, the Tax Court held that an abandonment 
of a partnership interest resulted in ordinary loss.150 The Tax Court 
observed that the court had “not, under the 1954 or later versions of the 
Internal Revenue Code, decided whether abandonment of assets 
(including partnership interests), where no partnership liabilities exist, 
results in ordinary, rather than capital, loss.”151 The Tax Court commented, 
                                                                                                             
146 Echols, 935 F.2d at 706. 
147 Id. at 709. 
148 Rev. Rul. 54-581, 1954-2 C.B. 112 
149 Treas. Reg. § 1,165-2(a). 
150 Citron v. Comm’r, 97 T.C. 200, 200-01 (1991). 
151 Id. at 215. 
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however, that it had decided “in the context of the Internal Revenue Code 
of 1939 . . . that abandonment (forfeiture) of a partnership interest was not 
a sale or exchange and could be accorded ordinary (rather than capital) 
loss treatment.”152 The Tax Court, furthermore, noted “[n]o changes were 
made in the loss provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 which 
would dictate a change in the case precedent under the 1939 Code.”153 It 
also pointed out that “[t]here is limited precedent, in other courts, under 
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 that the worthlessness of a partnership 
interest (a capital asset) may result in an ordinary loss.”154 
Revenue Ruling 93-80,155 like Echols decisions and Citron, also 
involved the abandonment and worthlessness of a partnership interest. The 
ruling examined two fact-patterns, one involving a deemed distribution to 
the taxpayer partner, in a situation, in which the partnership had 
nonrecourse liabilities in which the taxpayer partner shared and another in 
which the taxpayer limited partner “did not bear the economic risk of loss 
for any of the partnership liabilities in the basis of the partnership 
interest . . . [and] did not receive any money or property upon leaving the 
partnership.”156 While the Service concluded that the first fact-pattern 
resulted in a capital loss because “a deemed distribution” is made to the 
taxpayer partner in question, it determined that in the second situation, the 
taxpayer partner was entitled to an ordinary loss “because . . . [the partner] 
did not receive any actual or deemed distribution from the partnership.”157 
While the Fifth Circuit in Pilgrim’s Pride did not cite Rev. Rul. 93-80, and 
it did not involve an abandonment of a security, it too is arguably 
supportive of taxpayer’s ordinary loss argument. 
Notwithstanding Revenue Ruling 93-80, the decisions in Echols and 
Citron, the Service was not dissuaded from arguing in Pilgrim’s Pride that 
a disposition of securities through abandonment resulted in a capital loss. 
The Service cited Proesel v. Commissioner158 in support of its position that 
“an act of abandonment is an identifiable event that reflects the 
worthlessness of the property at that point to petitioner and fixes the 
loss.”159 Proesel is not a very persuasive precedent for this position. There 
is merely dicta in Proesel, a case involving taxpayer’s worthless loss claim 
                                                                                                             
152 Id. at 213. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
155 Rev. Rul. 93-80, 1993-2 C.B. 239. Abandonment losses were also discussed in a later 
revenue ruling. Rev. Rul. 2004-54, 2004-1 C.B. 1043 (discussing whether there were 
effective acts of abandonment with respect to several factual situations relating to motion 
picture rights, although the ruling has limited applicability to the issues in Pilgrim’s Pride). 
156 Rev. Rul. 93-80, 1993-2 C.B. 239. 
157 Rev. Rul. 93-80, 1993-2 C.B. 241. 
158 Proesel v. Comm’r, 77 T.C. 992 (1981). 
159 Opening Brief for Respondent, supra note 13, at 17. 
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from an involvement in a motion picture project through two layers of 
partnerships, that “an abandonment . . . reflect[s] the fact that the property 
is worthless.”160 
Despite the somewhat adverse authority, and Proesel being of limited 
support, the Service’s position was far from baseless. While a security or 
other property can be worthless, without being abandoned, it does not 
necessarily follow that an abandoned security should not by such act alone 
not be deemed to be worthless. There is logic to the Service’s assertion 
that “the act of surrendering the securities established that they were 
worthless to Gold Kist . . . that the securities were of no ‘use’ or ‘profit’ to 
Gold Kist, i.e. useless.”161 The Treasury Department’s Preamble to 
Proposed Regulation section 1.165-5(i) stated that 
The legislative history of the predecessor of section 
165(g) indicated that the provision was enacted to remove 
the “peculiar and anomalous results” that followed from 
treating losses from the worthlessness of securities as 
ordinary losses or deductions, and losses from the sale or 
exchange of securities as capital losses, because both 
losses represent a loss of capital in a transaction entered 
into for profit.162 
It would indeed be an anomaly for a taxpayer to be accorded capital 
loss treatment if he sells a security bought for $100 for $1 but would be 
entitled to an ordinary loss if the same security bought for $100 becomes 
worthless. Similarly, it is an anomaly that Pilgrim’s Pride should be in a 
better position after tax, by abandoning the Securities in question, than it 
would have been if its predecessor accepted the $20 million offered from 
                                                                                                             
160 Proesel, 77 T.C. at 1005. 
161 Brief for the Appellee at 55, Pilgrim’s Pride Corp. v. Comm’r, 779 F.3d 311 (5th Cir. 
2015) (No. 14-60295). 
162 Abandonment of Stock and Other Securities, 72 Fed. Reg. 41468 (proposed July 30, 
2007)(to be codified at 26 C.F. R. pt.1). Interestingly, the citation provided there, H.R. Rep. 
No. 1860, at 18-19 (1938), does not specifically refer to “peculiar and anomalous results.” 
Neither does the citation for this language provided for by the IRS Chief Counsel in its 
Opening Brief at 14, Pilgrim’s Pride v. Comm’r, 141 T.C. 533 (2013)(No. 12089-10), i.e., 
H.R. Rep. No. 75-2330, at 44-46 (1938). Nevertheless, this language was in fact quoted in 
J.S. SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN’S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS, 1938-
1861, 12 (The Law Exchange, Ltd. 2003), referring to House Ways & Means 
Subcommittee Report, H.R. Rep. No. (1938). Section 23 of the Revenue Act of 1938 stated 
that 
[i]f any securities . . . are ascertained to be worthless and charged off 
within the taxable year and are capital assets, the loss resulting 
therefrom shall . . . be considered as a loss from the sale or exchange, 
on the last day of such taxable year, of capital assets. 
Pub. L. No. 75-554, 52 Stat. 447 (1938). 
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Southern States. It is certainly bad public policy to encourage and 
subsidize taxpayers like Pilgrim’s Pride to act in such a manner that is 
commercially irrational absent tax considerations. While Treasury 
Regulation 1.165-5(i) is not effective, courts should not be unmindful of 
the policy concerns raised by it. Like a proposed regulation, it is not 
entitled to deference prior to its effective date, but as the Tax Court 
indicated about proposed regulations, under certain circumstances, “they 
can be useful guidelines . . . .”163 
In other words, why isn’t it reasonable to follow the premise of 
Treasury Regulation section 1.165-5(i), despite its legal inapplicability to 
the tax year in question, and determine the worth of the security to be the 
subjective value to the taxpayer the second after its abandonment? There 
is nothing per se in section 165(g)(1) instructing one not to ascertain a 
security’s worth by deeming it to be that of the taxpayer post abandonment 
nor any indication that Congress disfavored such an approach. Wouldn’t a 
court’s determination that section 165(g)(1) should characterize a security 
that is abandoned as worthless to the taxpayer and thus generally a capital 
loss be consistent with those who espouse dynamic statutory 
interpretation, i.e., what the provision “ought to mean in terms of the needs 
and goals of our present day society?”164 
I do recognize that the logic of the position that an abandoned security 
should be treated as worthless can be arguably challenged as follows. 
When someone gifts an item, except in unusual circumstances, it has 
value. That is, it would not be considered worthless simply because the 
donated property no longer has value to the donor. Why shouldn’t 
abandonment be treated similarly, i.e., a gift to the issuer that is not treated 
as worthless? I think there is a distinction between these fact-patterns. 
With a gift, while generally made out of “out of affection, respect, 
admiration, charity or like impulses,”165 the donor presumably receives 
non-monetary consideration of value, i.e., the emotional satisfaction of 
giving to the donee. In this respect, the donor has retained in a sense 
continuing value from the property. This is different from an 
abandonment, which, unlike a donation, is done invariably solely, as 
exemplified by Pilgrim’s Pride, to obtain a tax benefit. With an 
                                                                                                             
163 See, e.g., Seawright v. CIR, 117 T.C. 294, 300 (2001) (stating that “they can be useful 
guidelines where, as here, they closely follow the legislative history of the statutory 
provision in question.”). Id. Pilgrim’s Pride, 779 F.3d 311 (5th Cir. 2015) (stating that the 
final regulations do not follow the legislative history per se except arguably for eliminating 
another “anomaly” with loss characterization of securities). 
164 Eskridge, supra note 111. 
165 See Comm’r v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960) (citing Robertson v. United 
States, 343 U.S. 711, 714 (1952)). 
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abandonment, there is no remaining value to the donor, excluding the tax 
subsidy. 
From the vantage point of a purposivist, construing section 165(g)(1) 
as establishing the test of worthlessness of a security to be the subjective 
value to the taxpayer post abandonment would be reasonable. The 
overarching point of the section was for the “sale or exchange” 
requirement for capital loss treatment not to enable a taxpayer to have a 
more optimal tax result by having a security become worthless rather than 
selling it for a de minimis amount. One does not have to construe the 
provision very expansively to apply this same rationale to an abandoned 
security, which by such act no longer has any worth to the taxpayer. As 
Professor Popkin observed “the statute’s coverage can be extended to 
cases not within the text’s plain meaning in order to serve the statute’s 
purpose.”166 
Craig W. Friedrich, in discussing the reason why Proposed Regulation 
section 1.165-5(i)167 was issued, referred to a 
[S]tatutory accident [that] created a plain, if not rational, 
opportunity for tax planning that the fisc decided, quite 
reasonably in my view should not be there. Taxpayers and 
their advisors [are] seeking to avail themselves of the 
linguistic permission granted by the sale-or-exchange 
requirement by abandoning securities . . . .[T]he new 
rule . . . [is] giving effect to the legislative intent . . . .168 
Friedrich believes that solution crafted, i.e., regulations to be effective 
prospectively upon finalization, was the correct way of addressing the 
problem.169 I contend that a fact-pattern, like Pilgrim’s Pride, can be 
viewed not as “statutory accident” but a situation simply not addressed in 
the four corners of the provision and that a court’s “giving effect to the 
legislative intent . . .”,170 i.e., the purpose of the statute to address 
“anomalies” with respect to characterization of losses in securities, could, 
under certain circumstances, be proper. 
Would such a result offend a textualist? Perhaps, since there is nothing 
in the statutory text that specifically treats an abandoned security having 
objective value prior to its abandonment as coming within the reach of 
                                                                                                             
166 William D. Popkin, The Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpretation, 61 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 541, 604 (1988). 
167 Abandonment of Stock and Other Securities, 72 Fed. Reg. 41468 (proposed July 30, 
2007) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
168 Craig W. Friedrich, Proposed Regs Make Abandonment of ‘Securities’ Sale-or-
Exchange Under Section 165, 35 CORP. TAX’N 45, 46 (2008). 
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
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section 165(g)(1). On the other hand, the statute is silent as to how one 
should test for worthlessness. 
Absent Revenue Ruling 93-80,171 I believe the courts should have 
distinguished Echols I 172 and Echols II173 and other non-security decisions 
and treated the taxpayer’s loss to be a capital loss. There is a question, 
however, if it would be equitable to do so when the taxpayer undoubtedly 
considered the guidance as well as court decisions discussed above when 
it undertook the transaction. A taxpayer should be entitled to rely on 
published IRS guidance. Revenue Procedure 89-14 provides in pertinent 
part “[t]axpayers generally may rely upon revenue rulings . . . in 
determining the tax treatment of their own transactions.”174 Revenue 
rulings are thus binding on the Service until revoked. The Tax Court has 
rebuked the Service for taking a litigating position contrary to a revenue 
ruling stating: 
[T]he IRS has committed itself “to increased and more 
timely published guidance,” in the form of revenue 
rulings and revenue procedures, in the hopes of achieving 
increased taxpayer compliance and resolving “frequently 
disputed tax issues.” These stated goals will not be 
achieved if the Commissioner refuses to follow his own 
published guidance and argues in court proceedings that 
revenue rulings do not bind him or that his rulings are 
incorrect. Certainly, the Commissioner’s failure to follow 
his own rulings would be unfair to those taxpayers, such 
as petitioners herein, who have relied on revenue rulings 
to structure their transactions.175 
The issue becomes whether a taxpayer could reasonably rely on a 
revenue ruling addressing the abandonment of a partnership interest to be 
applicable to that of a security. The Service does specifically caveat 
revenue ruling reliance stating that “[b]ecause each revenue ruling 
represents the conclusion of the Service regarding the application of law 
to the entire statement of facts involved, taxpayers . . . are cautioned 
against reaching the same conclusion in other cases unless the facts and 
                                                                                                             
171 Rev. Rul. 93-80, 1993-2 C.B. 239. 
172 Echols v. Comm’r, 935 F.2d 703 (5th Cir. 1991). 
173 Echols v. Comm’r, 950 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1991). 
174 Rev. Proc. 89-14, 1989-1 C.B. 815, § 7.01(5). 
175 See Rauenhorst v. Comm’r, 119 T.C. 157, 183 (2002). In Estate of Delaune v. United 
States, 143 F.3d 995, 1005 (5th Cir. 1998), the Fifth Circuit stated “[a]s we recently held 
in Estate of McLendon . . . ‘the Commissioner will be held to his published rulings in areas 
where the law is unclear, and may not depart from them in individual cases.’” 
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circumstances are substantially the same.”176 In Pilgrim’s Pride, the 
taxpayer argued that “the general legal standards described in Revenue 
Ruling 93-80177 regarding the abandonment of a partnership interest 
should be considered to be equally applicable to the abandonment of stock 
because stock, like a partnership interest, is an intangible asset.”178 
While Revenue Ruling 93-80179 can be distinguished from Pilgrim’s 
Pride, in the absence of other guidance differentiating it from losses from 
abandoned securities, it served to undermine its litigating position in 
Pilgrim’s Pride. While it is a close question, for me it tipped the scales in 
taxpayer’s favor. Had the ruling not been issued or had it been 
distinguished from an abandonment of securities, I believe the Service’s 
position on this issue should have prevailed. One lasting lesson for the 
Service is that if it intends to litigate an issue, it should be very careful 
about clarifying published guidance that is at least arguably inconsistent 
with the view embraced in court. 
As a final point, one can only speculate as to why the Tax Court did 
not specifically address the applicability of section 165(g)(1) to the 
Pilgrim’s Pride fact-pattern. For one, the court might have believed that it 
would serve as a distraction to what it considered was its compelling 
analysis of section 1234A. Perhaps, it deemed section 165(g)(1) simply 
inapt. It could have been concerned about the precedent set by the Tax 
Court in Citron180 and the possible application of the Golsen rule 181 by 
virtue of the Fifth Circuit decisions in Echols I 182 and Echols II,183 or that 
taxpayer had undertaken the transaction in reliance of Revenue Ruling 93-
80.184 It would have been helpful, however, at least to legal scholars if the 
Tax Court addressed application of the section.185 
                                                                                                             
176 Rev. Proc. 2016-4, 2016-1 I.R.B. 142, § 3.07. 
177 Rev. Rul. 93-80, 1993-2 C.B. 239. 
178 Brief for the Appellant at 38-39 (footnotes omitted), Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., 779 F.3d 
311 (5th Cir. 2015). 
179 Rev. Rul. 93-80, 1993-2 C.B. 239. 
180 Citron, 97 T.C. at 200. 
181 Golsen v. Comm’r, 54 T.C. 742 (1970) (establishing a rule whereby the Tax Court is 
bound to follow the decisions of a court of appeals to which a particular case is appealable 
to). 
182 Echols, 935 F.2d 703 (5th Cir. 1991). 
183 Echols, 950 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1991). 
184 Rev. Rul. 93-80, 1993-2 C.B. 239. 
185 Cf., e.g., Framatome Connectors USA, Inc. v. Comm’r, 118 T.C. 32 (2002), aff’d 
without published opinion, 108 F. App’x 683 (2d. Cir. 2004) (addressing a Tax Court case 
involving whether a foreign subsidiary was a controlled foreign corporation). After first 
holding that taxpayer could not prevail because it could not avail itself of the doctrine of 
substance over form, the court then spent considerable analysis determining that the 
taxpayer would also lose on the basis of the substance of the arrangement. 
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B. Section 1234A 
Section 1234A is a conundrum of a provision that given the 
circumstance here, I believe, necessitates a different methodology for 
statutory interpretation than was advanced above for section 165(g)(1). 
Jasper L. Cummings, Jr. commented that 
Section 1234A suffers from multiple impediments: It is 
too brief, never explained by a regulation (the regulation 
proposed in 2004186 is yet to be finalized and does not deal 
with the issues addressed here [or in Pilgrim’s Pride], and 
located in the region of the code that tends to deal with 
derivatives, which causes everyone else to ignore it and 
the financial institutions and products folks to believe it 
was written just for them. In other words, section 1234A 
is a perfect setup for confusion.187 
Professor David J. Roberts was also highly critical of section 1234A. 
He wrote that “[s]ection 1234A cries out for clarification . . . Whatever 
Congress intended, the entire provision was simply not well thought 
out.”188 Linda E. Carlisle, in a similar vein, declared that “section 1234A 
has increased uncertainty and muddied the treatment of some contract 
rights.”189 
In Pilgrim’s Pride, both parties and courts embrace the concept of 
following the “plain terms”190 and/or “plain meaning”191 of the provision 
but not surprisingly, given the enigma of section 1234A, reached different 
conclusions. In its brief to the Fifth Circuit, the taxpayer stated, “[w]hen 
                                                                                                             
186 Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1234A-1 (Mar. 29, 2004) covers payments to terminate notional 
principal contracts, bullet swaps, and forward contracts. 
187 Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., Reexamining Capital Gains for Real Estate, 146 TAX NOTES 
1409, 1413 (2015). While not directly relevant to the application of I.R.C. § 1234A to 
Pilgrim’s Pride, there have been a few recent developments concerning the interpretation 
of I.R.C. § 1234A worth noting. In CRI-Leslie, LLC v. Comm’r, 147 T.C. No. 8 (2016), 
the Tax Court determined that I.R.C. § 1234A does not apply to section 1231 property. The 
IRS also provided guidance that it is now of the opinion that IRC § 1234A resulted in 
capital losses to the party that paid termination fees upon the breakup of a planned merger. 
See C.A.M. 2016-42035 (Feb. 9, 2016); F.A.A. 20163701F (May 3, 2016). This contrasts 
with older guidance by the Service holding that I.R.C. § 1234A does not result in capital 
gain treatment to the recipient of a termination fee. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 140872-07 
(Mar. 10, 2008). 
188 See David J. Roberts, Law Treating Certain Terminations as Sales Needs 
Clarification, 150 TAX NOTES 337, 345 (2016). 
189 Linda E. Carlisle, Gain or Loss on Termination, in James N. Calvin et al., Examining 
the Straddle Rules After 25 Years, 125 TAX NOTES 1301, 1320 (2009). 
190 See, e.g., Pilgrim’s Pride, 779 F.3d at 315. 
191 See, e.g., Pilgrim’s Pride, 141 T.C. at 542. 
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the language of the statute is clear on its face, it must be enforced 
according to its terms because ‘courts must presume that a legislature says 
in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.’”192 
The Service also cited the same quote in its brief to the Fifth Circuit, and 
followed with a further quote from Connecticut National Bank v. Germain 
that “[w]hen the words of a statute are unambiguous, then this first canon 
is also the last: ‘judicial inquiry is complete.’”193 While the Tax Court 
spent considerable analysis on what it believed to be Congress’ intentions, 
it too declared that “[s]tatutes are to be construed so as to give effect to the 
plain meaning of the words in the text unless we find that a word’s plain 
meaning is inescapably ambiguous”194 and that “where a statute is clear on 
its face, we require unequivocal evidence of legislative purpose before 
construing the statute so as to override the plain meaning of the words used 
therein.”195 The Fifth Circuit, at the outset of its analysis, sets forth its 
conclusion that 
By its plain terms, § 1234A(1) applies to the termination 
of rights or obligations with respect to capital assets (e.g. 
derivative or contractual rights to buy or sell capital 
assets). It does not apply to the termination of ownership 
of the capital asset itself. Applied to the facts of this case, 
Pilgrim’s Pride abandoned the Securities, not a “right or 
obligation . . . with respect to” the Securities.196 
A textualist would be presumably pleased with the Fifth Circuit’s 
persuasive analysis. I concur that it was the appropriate methodology in 
this instance. 
As noted above, the Court of Appeals rejected the Service’s assertion 
that section 1234A(1) should be germane to the taxpayer’s fact-pattern on 
the basis that ownership of stock by its nature contains inherent rights that 
are the subject of section 1234A. The Court of Appeals held that 
“Congress does not legislate in logic puzzles, and we do not ‘tag Congress 
with an extravagant preference for the opaque when the use of a clear 
adjective or noun would have worked nicely.’”197 The Fifth Circuit also 
commented that the Service “does not provide us any reason to forego that 
                                                                                                             
192 Brief for the Appellant, supra note 178, at 13 (citing Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. 
Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992) and United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 
U.S. 235, 241-42 (1989)). 
193 Brief for the Appellee, supra note 161, at 21 (citing Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. 
Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992)). 
194 Pilgrim’s Pride, 141 T.C. at 542. 
195 Id. 
196 Pilgrim’s Pride, 779 F. 3d at 315. 
197 Id. (citing Gutierrez v. Ada, 528 U.S. 250, 256 (2000)). 
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assumption”198 that “the ordinary meaning of [statutory] language 
accurately expresses the legislative purpose.”199 The Fifth Circuit 
concluded that the Service’s construction of the statute was “far too 
convoluted to believe Congress intended it.”200 
The Fifth Circuit, cited for support, inter alia, lines from a Bible for 
textualists and originalists, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal 
Texts by the late Justice Antonin Scalia and Bryan A Garner.201 The Court 
of Appeals opined that “[t]he Commissioner’s interpretation of 
§ 1234A(1) also would render superfluous § 1234A(2), violating the rule 
of statutory interpretation that ‘we are obligated to give effect, if possible, 
to every word Congress used.’”202 That is, as noted above, the Fifth Circuit 
essentially asked why would it be necessary to enact section 1234A(2) if 
the Service’s construction of section 1234A(1) was correct since under 
such interpretation “the termination of any section 1256 contract which is 
a capital asset would be covered . . . ”203 already by section 1234A(1). 
The Court of Appeals was properly dismissive of the Service’s 
assertion that section 1234A(2) was not “superfluous because it ensures 
that ‘gain or loss from a deemed termination by offset will be treated as 
gain or loss from the sale of a capital asset.’”204 The Fifth Circuit’s 
reasoned that offsets are included in section 1234 A(1) by virtue of the 
words “or other terminations” in the opening line of section 1234A.205 
Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit correctly concluded that the Service’s 
                                                                                                             
198 Id. 
199 Id. (citing Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 175 (2009)). 
200 Id. at 316 (citing Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 90 (2001)). It is 
interesting to note that the Fifth Circuit’s focus on textualism in construing I.R.C. § 1234A 
in contrast to a somewhat more intentualist approach by the Tax Court is consistent with 
Professor David F. Shores’ review of tax litigation in the Tax Court and Court of Appeals 
between 2000 and 2006, where he concluded that the Tax Court is more likely to be more 
receptive to intentionalism theories while the Court of Appeals was found to have generally 
embraced textualism. David F. Shores, Textualism and Intentionalism in Tax Litigation, 61 
TAX L. 53 (2007). Jasper Cummings recently observed that in the period from 2008- to 
2015, while there was “a sharp decline in the number of reversals of Tax Court 
interpretations of statutes that the appellate court found to ‘clearly’ have a different 
meaning . . . the Tax Court was still on the intentionalist side of the interpretation and the 
appellate courts on the literalist side.” Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., Trending Literalism in the 
Tax Court, 153 TAX NOTES 1461, 1466 (2016). 
201 See Note 100, supra at 174. The Fifth Circuit’s quote from the text was: “If possible, 
every word and every provision is to be given effect. None should needlessly be given an 
interpretation that causes it to duplicate another provision or to have no consequence.” 
Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., 779 F.3d at 316. 
202 Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., 779 F.3d at 316 (citing Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 
339 (1979)). 
203 Id. 
204 Id. (footnote omitted). 
205 Id. 
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position “would require us to hold that § 1234A(2)’s only purpose is to 
address termination by offset, and that Congress chose a remarkably 
convoluted way to effectuate that purpose.”206 
Why was it proper for the Fifth Circuit to reach its decision vis-à-vis 
section 1234A using a textualist approach but this methodology was 
unsuitable for construing section 165(g)(1)? I would argue that unlike 
section 165(g)(1), except for some legitimate questions about what 
Congress intended when section 1234A was amended by the Taxpayer 
Relief Act of 1997,207 there was no compelling policy reason for deviating 
from the construing section 1234A in conformity with the plain meaning 
of the text. That is, if one examines the intention and purpose of the 
provision as well as how it should apply from a policy standpoint by “what 
it ought to mean in terms of the needs and goals of our present day 
society,”208 including the existence already in the Internal Revenue Code 
of section 165(g)(1), there does not seem to be a convincing case that it 
should not be deemed to impose a sale on the abandonment of a security. 
I am not unmindful of the justifiable concern raised by Professors 
Cunningham and Repetti, as well as others, that “[t]he ascendancy of 
textualism has had its greatest impact by facilitating the promotion and 
sale of ‘abusive’ tax shelters.”209 An example of how utilizing a textualist 
methodology can serve to permit a taxpayer to obtain an unjustifiable tax 
benefit is the recent Sixth Circuit decision Wright v. Commissioner.210 The 
case dealt with section 1256, another section, like section 1234A, enacted 
as part of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981211 that addressed tax 
abuse with financial instruments. A textualist approach was employed in 
interpreting the statute in a manner that blatantly ignored the policy 
concerns of the provision. In Wright, the taxpayers “claimed a large tax 
loss by marking to market a euro put option upon the . . . [taxpayers’] 
assignment of the option to charity.”212 The Sixth Circuit acknowledged 
that the “transactions [undertaken] appear to have allowed the . . . 
[taxpayers] to generate a large tax loss at minimal economic risk or out-
of-pocket expense.”213 
                                                                                                             
206 Id. 
207 Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 1003, 111 Stat.788, 909-910 
(1997). 
208 Eskridge, supra note 111, at 50, n.7. 
209 Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 90, at 20. 
210 Wright v. Comm’r, 809 F.3d 877 (6th Cir. 2016). 
211 The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, P.L. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981). 
212 Wright, 809 F.3d at 878. 
213 Id. The Sixth Circuit, quoting from the Service’s brief, described the tax shelter 
strategy utilized in Wright as follows: 
The major-minor tax shelter was designed to manipulate the mark-to-
market rules . . . . The taxpayer arranges with a counterparty for four 
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The issue in Wright was whether an over-the-counter option in a major 
currency, was a “foreign currency contract” within the meaning of section 
1256(g)(2)(A) as taxpayer contended, allowing them to trigger large tax 
losses on the-mark-to-market rules of section 1256. The Sixth Circuit 
reversed the Tax Court, which had held for the Service. The Sixth Circuit 
stated that “the Tax Court’s reasoning [finding section 1256(g)(2)(A) 
inapplicable] appears to be supported by sound tax policy, but nonetheless 
conflicts with the plain language of § 1256.”214   
In reaching its conclusion, the Sixth Circuit rejected the need to 
examine the provision’s legislative history,215 and ignored the fact that “no 
conceivable tax policy . . . supports this interpretation of the plain 
language of § 1256 . . . .”216 This statement presumably would make a 
pragmatist, like Judge Posner, cringe. Jasper L. Cummings Jr. was very 
disparaging of this statement that Cummings indicated “bragged” about 
this ignorance of any tax policy concerns.217 Cummings condemned the 
blind textualism employed in Wright with the comment that “if appellate 
judges do no more than parse the grammar of statutes, they might as well 
                                                                                                             
OTC [over-the-counter] options. The taxpayer buys from the 
counterparty a euro call and a euro put on mirror-image terms. The 
taxpayer also sells to the counterparty a krone call and a krone put on 
mirror-image terms. The premiums paid to and received from the 
counterparty mostly offset each other. Because the call and put for each 
currency are mirror images of each other, one will rise while the other 
will fall. Because the krone is closely tied to the euro, both calls should 
largely offset each other, as should both puts. The taxpayer and the 
counterparty then retain their premiums, but the taxpayer assigns to a 
charity his rights and obligations under the depreciated euro option and 
the appreciated (and offsetting) krone option (i.e., the charity receives 
both calls or both puts). The taxpayer asserts that the assignment of the 
losing euro option is a recognition event under § 1256(c)(1), and he 
invokes the mark-to-market rules to claim a loss . . . . Because [the 
taxpayer takes the position that] the krone option is not a § 1256 
contract, the taxpayer recognizes gain, if ever, when his obligation to 
perform is terminated by the closing or lapse of the option. The 
taxpayer and the counterparty then terminate the unassigned options so 
that the gain on one offsets the loss on the other. If the taxpayer’s 
reading of § 1256 is correct, he receives a large tax loss with minimal 
economic risk or out-of-pocket expense. Moreover, because the 
options are offsetting and can be settled in dollars, the nominal 
amounts of foreign currency can be set well beyond the means of the 
parties, so as to generate the tax loss desired by the taxpayer. 
Id. at 880. 
214 Id. at 882. 
215 Id. at 884. 
216 Id. 
217 Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., Are Judges Just English Teachers?, 151 TAX NOTES 1553 
(2016). 
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be English teachers and not lawyers.”218 The Sixth Circuit clearly did not 
adhere to the advice of Judge Posner to “focus on the practical 
consequences of their decision . . . .”219 
One other aspect of the Wright decision is worth mentioning relating 
to a self-inflicted wound on the part of the Service. This is somewhat 
comparable to concerns expressed herein regarding both the issuance of 
Revenue Ruling 93-80220 without distinguishing guidance until 2007 
relating to the characterization of losses upon the abandonment of 
securities, as well as the failure to promulgate regulations under section 
1234A addressing the issue at hand. While Cummings and others 
justifiably criticized the Wright decision,221 the Sixth Circuit was correct 
in faulting the Service for the failure to issue regulations “that excludes 
foreign currency options from the definition of a ‘foreign currency 
contract.’”222 John Kaufmann commented about Wright that 
Regardless of the merits of the ‘plain meaning’ argument, 
the estoppel argument made by the court near the end of 
the opinion seems to be a winner. When Congress passed 
the 1982 act, it granted the IRS the authority to issue 
regulations interpreting the meaning of the term ‘foreign 
currency contract.’ The IRS knew that there was a 
difference of opinion regarding the interpretation of the 
term, and it had the power to clarify that foreign currency 
options do not constitute foreign currency contracts 
simply by declaring so in a regulation. The IRS can hardly 
complain that it lost a case because it sat on the right to 
settle the issue in its favor for 34 years.223 
While denying ordinary loss treatment on the abandonment of a 
security could and should have been dealt with prior to the effective date 
of 1.165-5(i), by a somewhat expansive interpretation of section 165(g)(1), 
this was thwarted by the Service’s issuance of Revenue Ruling 93-80224 
without other guidance distinguishing it from a security abandonment. 
Unlike the partnership provisions that Professors Cunningham and Repetti 
                                                                                                             
218 Id. 
219 Posner, supra note 115, at 90. 
220 Rev. Rul. 93-80, 1993-2 C.B. 239. 
221 See, e.g., William R Davis, Court Decision Spurs Foreign Currency Option Treatment 
Debate, TAX NOTES TODAY (Mar. 10, 2016). 
222 Wright v. Comm’r, 809 F.3d 877, 885 (6th Cir. 2016). 
223 John Kaufmann, Sixth Circuit Follows Plain Meaning; Tax Bar Up in Arms, 150 TAX 
NOTES 923, 926 (2016). 
224 Rev. Rul. 93-80, 1993-2 C.B. 239. 
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allude to,225 the ordinary loss on abandonment of securities was not created 
by section 1234A, and it should not serve as the proverbial finger in the 
dyke when there was, I believe, a more artful method for solving the 
problem, absent the Service’s misstep. 
In terms of the legislative history to section 1234A, it was enacted in 
1981 as part of the provisions addressing tax straddles in the Economic 
Recovery Tax Act of 1981.226 As originally enacted section 1234A 
provided: 
Gain or loss attributable to the cancellation, lapse, 
expiration or other termination of a right or obligation 
with respect to personal property (as defined in section 
1092(d)(1)) which is (or on acquisition would be) a capital 
asset in the hands of the taxpayer shall be treated as gain 
or loss from the sale of a capital asset.227 
The key wording insofar as to whether or not section 1234A should 
apply to the abandonment of a security, i.e., “cancellation, lapse, 
expiration or other termination of a right or obligation with respect to 
property” was never revised. According to the legislative history of the 
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, section 1234A was enacted because 
“the change in the sale or exchange rule is necessary to prevent tax-
avoidance transactions designed to create fully-deductible ordinary losses 
on certain dispositions of capital assets, which if sold at a gain, would 
produce capital gains.”228 Congress was concerned that “[s]ome taxpayers 
and tax shelter promoters have attempted to exploit court decisions 
holding that ordinary income or loss results from certain dispositions of 
property whose sale or exchange would produce capital gain or loss.”229 
Its target was apparently a limited class of capital assets and transactions 
including “ordinary loss and capital gain transactions [that] involve 
cancellations of forward contracts for currency or securities.”230 
Linda E. Carlisle reflected on the background to section 1234A as 
follows: 
Before 1981, commodity transactions were used to create 
“silver butterflies,” “gold cash-and-carry transactions,” 
and “T-bill rolls” to defer and convert ordinary income 
                                                                                                             
225 Cunningham & Repetti, supra note 90, at 20-63. 
226 The Economic Recovery Tax Act, Pub L. No. 97-34, § 507(a), 95 Stat. 172, 333 
(1981). 
227 Id. 
228 H.R. Rep. No. 97-201, at 212 (1981). 
229 Id.; see also S. Rep. No. 97-144, at 170 (1981). 
230 Id. 
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into capital gains. In June 1980, however, the process of 
tax reform in the commodity area began, and the 
butterflies began to take flight. 
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA) 
enacted a set of new rules to reform the world of financial 
transactions, which at that time consisted mainly of 
commodity derivative transactions. ERTA dealt 
comprehensively with commodity transactions by 
imposing the recognition of losses on straddle positions 
under section 1092, requiring regulated futures contracts 
to be marked to market under section 1256, requiring the 
capitalization of interest and carrying charges for straddle 
positions under section 263(g), and settling the 
“confusion” that had arisen regarding the treatment of 
some contract rights under section 1234A.231 
A forerunner to the enactment of section 1234A, was proposed 
legislation introduced by Senator Daniel P Moynihan. Senator 
Moynihan’s bill, if enacted, would have addressed the character arbitrage 
in straddle transactions by incorporating a very broad definition of “sale 
or exchange” in section 7701(a) that would have provided that “[t]he term 
‘sale or exchange’ when used with reference to any capital asset means 
any disposition of such asset.”232 The legislative history does not explain 
why Congress chose to address the perceived abuse differently. 
There is also a possible disconnect between how both the House Ways 
and Means and Senate Finance Committee reports accompanying the 
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 described the tax loss character 
manipulation section 1234A was intended to address and the final 
language of the provision. The Congressional reports in describing the 
problem indicated that 
[A]s a result of these interpretations, losses from the 
termination, cancellation, lapse, abandonment and other 
dispositions of property, which are not sales or exchanges 
of the property, are reported as fully deductible ordinary 
losses instead of as capital losses.233 
                                                                                                             
231 Carlisle, supra note 189, at 1319-20. 
232 Commodity Straddles Tax Act of 1981, S. 626, § 6 (1981). 
233 H.R. Rep. No. 97-201, at 212 (1981); see also S. Rep. No. 97-144, at 170 (1981). It 
should also be noted that the word “abandonment” was also not included in the group of 
actions triggering the operative provision of the section. 
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Nevertheless, section 1234A, as enacted, was more narrowly crafted, 
i.e., it only addressed “gain or loss attributable to the cancellation, lapse, 
expiration or other termination of a right or obligation with respect to 
personal property . . . .”234 
There were a number of modifications to section 1234A after 1981 
but, very significantly, the term “right or obligation with respect to” was 
never altered. Shortly after its enactment, Congress made a technical 
correction to section 1234A, adding section 1234A(2), to have it also apply 
to “a regulated futures contract (as defined in section 1256) not described 
in paragraph (1), which is a capital asset in the hands of the 
taxpayer . . . .”235 This change was made in association with a revision to 
section 1256 which removed the condition that a contract must require 
delivery of “personal property,” as defined in section 1092(d)(1), to be 
treated as a regulated futures contract.236 Unlike 1234A(1), Section 
1234A(2) as both initially enacted and as written throughout its history 
does not refer to “a right or obligation.”237 
The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 made further revisions to 1234A.238  
With respect the Pilgrim’s Pride fact-pattern, more scrutiny is required as 
to the changes made to section 1234A by the Taxpayer Relief Act of 
                                                                                                             
234 The Economic Recovery Tax Act, Pub L. No. 97-34, § 507(a), 95 Stat. 172, 333 
(1981) (emphasis added). 
235 Technical Corrections Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-448, § 105(e), 96 Stat. 2365, 2387 
(1983). 
236 Id. at 2365, 2385. 
237 According to Linda Carlyle, 
Congress was concerned that those contracts, which settle only in cash, 
would not be treated as rights or obligations regarding capital assets 
because cash is not a capital asset. The legislative history makes it clear 
that capital gain or loss treatment under section 1234A(1) was based 
on the termination of contracts with respect to property that is, or on 
acquisition would be, a capital asset in the hands of the taxpayer. 
Carlisle, supra note 189, at 1320. In a recent thought-provoking article on section 1234A, 
Professor David J. Roberts raises the question as “[w]hen section 1234A(1) refers to ‘a 
right or obligation . . . with respect to property which is (or on acquisition would be) a 
capital asset,’ what is supposed to be the capital asset- the right or obligation, or the 
property itself?” He answers his question that “[p]resumably it is the property itself . . . . 
But how sure are we of this?” See Roberts, supra note 3, at 338. 
238 The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (1984). One 
change made was that Section 1234A(2) was amended to delete the phrase “a regulated 
futures contract” and replace it with “a section 1256 contract.” Id. § 102(e)(4), 98 Stat. 494, 
624 (1984). This was made in connection with section 1256’s amendment to apply to 
additional financial contracts. Id. § 102(a)(2), 98 Stat. 494, 620 (1984). Another change 
made by the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 was the addition of a final sentence, effective 
as if included in the original provision, clarifying that section 1234A would “not apply to 
the retirement of any debt instrument (whether or not through a trust or other participation 
arrangement).” Id. § 102(e)(9), 98 Stat. 494, 625 (1984). The word “arrangement” was 
subsequently changed to “agreement.” 
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1997.239 In 1997, Congress amended Section 1234A(1) by substituting the 
phrase “personal property (as defined in section 1092(d)(1)” with the term 
“property.”240 
The Senate Finance Committee Report, in explaining the reason for 
the amendment, stated that it “believes that present law is deficient since 
it (1) taxes similar economic transactions differently, (2) effectively 
provides some, but not all, taxpayers with an election [as to the character 
of the gain or loss], and (3) its lack of certainty makes the tax laws 
unnecessarily difficult to administer.”241 The Senate Finance Committee 
also pointed out that “some transactions, such as settlements of contracts 
to deliver a capital asset, are economically equivalent to a sale or exchange 
of such contracts since the value of any asset is the present value of the 
future income that such asset will produce.”242 
The taxpayer characterized the change as “cover[ing] contractual and 
other derivative rights with respect to all types of property, not just 
publicly traded personal property.”243 Section 1234A’s scope was 
certainly expanded by the 1997 statutory modification. Thus, after this 
amendment to the provision, section 1234A(1) was applicable to 
“cancellation, lapse, expiration, or other termination of a right or 
obligation” of any property, including real property, and non-actively 
traded personal property, assuming the property” is (or on acquisition 
would be) a capital asset in the hands of the taxpayer.” The original 
limitation of section 1234A(1) to a “right or obligation with respect to” 
such property, was, however, not removed from the provision. That is, the 
amendments made in 1997 retained the restriction as to its applicability to 
“the cancellation, lapse, expiration, or other termination of a right or 
obligation . . . with respect to property which is (or on acquisition would 
be) a capital asset . . . .” 
Did Congress intend that the amendment would broaden section 
1234A(1) to cover the abandonment of a security? It certainly did not 
                                                                                                             
239 The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 1003(a), 111 Stat. 788, 909-
10 (1997). 
240 Id. 
241 S. Rep. No. 105-33, at 134 (1997). 
242 Id. 
243 Brief for the Appellant, supra note 178, at 28 (footnote omitted). H.R. Rep, No. 105-
148 explained that Congress was concerned that 
to the extent that present law treats modification of property rights as 
not being a sale or exchange, present law effectively provides, in many 
cases, taxpayers with an election to treat the transactions as giving rise 
to capital gain, subject to more favorable rates than ordinary income, 
or ordinary loss that can offset higher-taxed ordinary income and not 
be the subject to limitations on use of capital losses.  
Id. at 453. 
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specifically mention this transaction in the legislative history. There is, I 
believe, a legitimate question, as to what exactly Congress envisioned by 
the 1997 changes. Did they mean for the section to expand beyond 
derivatives? If so, why were the words “right or obligation with respect 
to” property retained? Perhaps this was faulty drafting, but alternatively it 
is also quite plausible that the scope of its objective was more limited. 
In arguing for applying section 1234A to the abandonment of a 
security, the Tax Court referred to the fact that the Senate Finance 
Committee report cited Fairbanks v. United States,244 where the Supreme 
Court held that gain realized on the redemption of bonds before their 
maturity was not entitled to capital gain treatment because the redemption 
was not a “sale or exchange.”245 The Tax Court stated that “[t]he example 
of a redemption of a bond is most significant given that Congress had long 
since overturned the result in Fairbanks by enacting the predecessor of 
section 1271(a) in the Revenue Act of 1934 . . . .”246 The Service asserted 
that “[t]he citation of Fairbanks as an example in the legislative history 
demonstrates that Congress was concerned about court decisions 
addressing termination of rights inherent in property and not merely 
derivative rights.”247 The point regarding Fairbanks is certainly not 
unfounded. There is some discrepancy between the legislative history to 
the changes made to section 1234A in 1997 and the literal language of the 
amended section. Furthermore, there may be justifiable policy reasons for 
section 1234A to mandate capital treatment not only for rights and 
obligations in securities but for the security itself. 
In contrast to the Service’s position, the taxpayer described the 
legislative history to the section 1234A amendment to the Taxpayer Relief 
Act of 1997248 as follows: 
The House Committee on the Budget restated some of the 
same issues addressed in the legislative history to the 
1981 Act, broadly described the sale or exchange 
requirement, and then went on to focus specifically on the 
termination of contractual interests or the modification of 
property rights under contracts where the asset underlying 
the contract is a capital asset.249 
                                                                                                             
244 Fairbanks v. United States, 306 U.S. 436 (1939). 
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The taxpayer also observed that the reference in the legislative history 
to U.S. Freight Co. v. United States250 is proof that Congress envisioned 
that section 1234A continue to target derivatives because: 
The stock example used by Congress solely involved a contract to 
purchase stock, and not the direct ownership of the stock itself. Had 
Congress intended to cover the termination of direct ownership of stock, 
one has to presume Congress would have provided an example of a 
termination of direct ownership. 251 
While the foregoing is hyperbole on the part of the taxpayer, absent a 
clear indication that the text of the statute did not mirror Congressional 
objectives, I believe one should be reticent to assume the latter.252 If the 
language did not reflect what it intended, why wasn’t it amended through 
a technical correction or otherwise? Furthermore, regulations should have 
been promulgated incorporating the Service’s interpretation of section 
1234A to “inherent” rights.253 Additionally, it is certainly not a situation 
where “[t]he statutory context . . . clearly indicate[s] that the only sensible, 
logical interpretation is a nonliteral interpretation.”254 Finally, as was 
discussed, absent the issuance of Revenue Ruling. 93-80, 255 there was, 
under my analysis, a statutory vehicle for addressing the abuse in this case 
already in place in the form of section 165(g)(1). Thus, while admittedly I 
am not free from doubt, I believe Fifth Circuit was correct in finding 
section 1234A inapplicable to Pilgrim’s Pride. 
With respect to the failure to promulgate regulations under section 
1234A, I recognize that the same criticism could be leveled toward my 
view that, absent the issuance of Revenue Ruling 93-80,256 a court should 
have held the abandonment resulted in a capital loss even prior to Treasury 
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§ 1234A in Pilgrim’s Pride as “far-out.” Cummings, supra note 200, at 1469. Nevertheless, 
the author was told by one of the smartest tax lawyers in the U.S., whose judgment on 
federal income tax matters is impeccable, that in his opinion, the Tax Court’s analysis of 
§ 1234A was correct. 
253 Pilgrim’s Pride, 779 F.3d at 315. 
254 Zelenak, supra note 125, at 637. 
255 Rev. Rul. 93-80, 1993-2 C.B. 239. 
256 Id. 
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Regulation section 1.165-5(i) becoming legally effective. In my opinion, 
the difference is that Treasury Regulation section 165 (g)(1) is silent as to 
how the determination of worthlessness is made. In comparison, section 
1234A(1) contains the specific condition of there being “a right or 
obligation,” a requirement that has not been altered. For section 1234A to 
apply to Pilgrim’ s Pride, it is necessary to subscribe to the Tax Court’s 
“inherent” right theory,257 compelling one to “tag Congress with an 
extravagant preference for the opaque . . . .” 258 This, for me, is a bridge 
too far. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
There are some lessons that can be gained from studying Pilgrim’s 
Pride. While not of major consequence for either of the courts, I believe it 
is fair to conclude that Revenue Ruling 93-80259 undercut the Service’s 
position that the loss from abandonment of the securities should be 
considered as a capital loss pursuant to section 165(g)(1). The Service 
needs to be very careful when issuing guidance that can potentially be used 
against it in litigation. Furthermore, prior to taking the position in court 
that section 1234A addressed “inherent” rights260 such as in Pilgrim’s 
Pride, it should have at least promulgated regulations covering this point. 
This teaching has application well beyond section 1234A, as shown in 
Wright v. Commissioner.261 
  Pilgrim’s Pride also most importantly illustrates the wisdom of 
utilizing a disparity of statutory interpretation methodologies depending 
upon the circumstances. As demonstrated by the different approaches that 
I believe were proper here for considering the applicability of sections 
165(g)(1) and 1234A to Pilgrim’s Pride, distinct circumstances require 
discrete approaches to applying a statutory provision to a case. Surely, our 
democratic institutions are not put at risk, by foregoing dogmatic 
textualism where this would lead to a result where “no conceivable tax 
policy . . . supports this interpretation”262 or deeming an abandoned 
security to be per se worthless. Restraint, however, from deviating from 
the clear language of the text, such as applying section 1234A to inherent 
rights, may be in order where there are no overriding reasons not to do so. 
                                                                                                             
257 Pilgrim’s Pride, 141 T.C. at 543. 
258 Pilgrim’s Pride, 779 F.3d at 315 (citing Gutierrez v. Ada, 528 U.S. 250, 256 (2000)). 
259 Rev. Rul. 93-80, 1993-2 C.B. 239. 
260 Pilgrim’s Pride, 141 T.C. at 543. 
261 Wright, 809 F.3d 877(6th Cir. 2016). 
262 Id. at 884. 
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An eclectic utilization of methodologies may be optimal for a court in 
arriving at the right conclusion.263 
                                                                                                             
263 Professor Popkin philosophizes that in “the process of judging . . . there is often no 
right answer. The fact that the judge is required to reach a decision by the best possible 
method means only that the judge must seek a right answer, not that he or she will be 
successful.” See Popkin, note 112, at 76 (emphasis in the original). 
